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Erie and Preemption: Killing One Bird with Two Stones 
JEFFREY L. RENSBERGER* 
The Supreme Court has developed a standard account of the Erie doctrine. The 
Court has directed different analyses of Erie cases depending upon whether the 
federal law in question is in the form of a federal rule (or statute) or is instead a 
judge-made law. But the cases applying the doctrine are difficult to explain using the 
standard account. Although the Court and commentators have noted that Erie is a 
type of preemption, they provide little, if any, rigorous analysis of Erie in light of 
preemption doctrines. This Article attempts to fill that void, offering an extended 
analysis of Erie as a preemption doctrine. The analysis demonstrates how and why 
Erie constitutes a species of preemption. It then shows the appropriateness of 
preemption analysis to Erie problems whether one is dealing with a federal rule of 
civil procedure or with federal common law. Because preemption underlies both 
wings of the Erie doctrine, the standard account’s bifurcated approach is wrong. 
Moreover, employing doctrines developed in other preemption contexts explains the 
results of the Supreme Court’s Erie cases better than the Court’s own standard 
account. By making explicit the linkage between Erie and preemption, one can clarify 
the analysis and better predict and explain the results of the Supreme Court’s cases. 
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The old adage marks the act of killing two birds with one stone as pure cleverness. 
Rather than repeat one’s effort, the same work achieves two ends simultaneously. 
When a single stone would do for killing two birds, only a fool would launch more 
than one. But an even greater foolishness exists in launching two stones at a single 
bird when only one would do. The law occasionally attempts to kill one bird with 
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two stones because it does not realize that there is but a single bird. It sometimes 
aims two doctrines—the stones of law1—at what is in fact only one bird—one legal 
issue.2 Recognizing this fact would lead to less effort and increased cogency in the 
analysis of the single problem. 
The instance of targeting one bird with two stones that this Article assesses is the 
dual doctrines of Erie3 and preemption.4 We have in our legal toolbox an Erie 
doctrine used to solve Erie problems and a preemption doctrine used to solve 
preemption problems. Erie and preemption have seldom been rigorously analyzed as 
different aspects of the same problem. Neither line of cases consults the other, and 
commentators do not usually subject them to a unitary analysis. 
But one can easily view the two doctrines as answers to a single problem. To 
illustrate this point, suppose litigation in which federal law requires a party to do X 
but state law requires a party to do X and also Y. The issue in such a case is whether 
the less exacting standard of federal law voids the state law’s additional requirement. 
Is this a preemption case or an Erie case? Well, it is both. The template above 
describes cases such as Wyeth v. Levine,5 which considered whether compliance with 
a federal regulation on warnings insulated a drug manufacturer from liability under 
a state tort law claim that would have required additional warnings. Similarly, 
Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.,6 considered whether an automobile 
manufacturer could be held liable under state law for failing to install 
lap-and-shoulder-style restraints in an inner rear seat when federal law gave the 
manufacturer the option of using either that type of restraint or a simple lap belt. Both 
of these cases were decided under the preemption doctrine. But the template also 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Cf. WILLIAM BLAKE, THE MARRIAGE OF HEAVEN AND HELL plate 8, at 67 (Michael Phillips 
ed., 2011) (1790) (“Prisons are built with stones of Law, Brothels with bricks of Religion.”). 
 2. Examples are not difficult to identify. In property law, two closely related defeasible 
estates existed at common law, the fee simple determinable and the fee simple subject to 
condition subsequent. Their differences, having to do with the language employed to create 
them and the manner in which they terminated, create more problems than any distinction is 
worth. Some states have therefore abolished one of the two. See D. Benjamin Barros, Toward 
a Model Law of Estates and Future Interests, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 41 (2009). 
Similarly duplicative are the largely parallel causes of action for personal injury from 
defective products in implied warranty and strict tort liability. See Sean M. Flower, Note, Is 
Strict Product Liability in Tort Identical to Implied Warranty in Contract in the Context of 
Personal Injuries? Denny v. Ford Motor Company, 62 MO. L. REV. 381, 387 (1997) (“While 
both claims are generally available, many scholars have argued that warranty and strict 
liability are substantively the same claim when brought for personal injury damages.”). 
 3. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie doctrine provides that 
federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law. See id. at 78. 
 4. See Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1265 (2012) (“Pre-emption 
of state law thus occurs through the ‘direct operation of the Supremacy Clause.’” (quoting 
Brown v. Hotel Emps., 468 U.S. 491, 501 (1984))). 
 5. 555 U.S. 555, 560 (2009) (holding a drug manufacturer liable for failure to warn under 
state law even though it had complied with federal labeling requirements). 
 6. 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1133 (2011) (holding that a federal regulation allowing automobile 
manufacturers to install in rear center seats either a lap belt or a lap-and-shoulder belt did not 
preempt state tort law requiring a lap-and-shoulder belt). 
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describes cases such as Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,7 which considered 
whether under Erie plaintiffs had to comply with a state statute requiring a bond as 
security for costs in a derivative action when Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
imposed various procedural requirements for derivative actions but did not, however, 
require a bond.8 
It is my thesis that both Erie and traditional preemption address the same problem, 
or at least subcategories of the same problem. If courts subjected them to an explicitly 
common analysis, judicial reasoning would become clearer, particularly on the Erie 
side of the newly conjoined structure. And the clearer analysis would enable courts 
to achieve better solutions to the Erie issues. It is of course possible that both 
doctrines are weak, confused, and poorly constructed and that this is an instance of 
two beggars meeting in the dark and tragically seeking from the other what they both 
lack. In fact, something of a consensus exists in the commentary that both doctrines 
are a mess.9 But at a minimum, if the thesis of similarity of the doctrines is correct, 
then uniting the two will inevitably shed some light, even if what is exposed are 
common failings rather than a success, that could be borrowed from one to the other. 
My particular focus is on the Erie doctrine. I believe that recognizing Erie as 
inevitably a preemption doctrine will lead to a better mode of Erie analysis. My 
conclusions specifically are as follows: First, any Erie issue, whether the federal law 
in question is embodied in a federal rule of civil procedure (or federal statute) or is 
instead judicially created, is a preemption issue and should be analyzed in the same 
manner. This is a rejection of the Supreme Court’s dichotomous approach to Erie, 
which uses different analyses depending upon whether the federal law is embodied 
in a federal rule or statute or is judge-made. Second, the unavoidable questions in 
any Erie case (whether or not a federal rule is involved) are the existence and 
intended scope of federal law. Consistent with preemption analysis, the nature of 
competing state law and the federal policy underlying the federal law should inform 
the scope of a federal rule. Third, because, like preemption, Erie measures federal 
law against state law to sort out conflicting polices and interests, Erie questions must 
be answered on a state-by-state basis rather than categorically finding a particular 
type of issue always to be governed by federal (or state) law.10 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
 8. FED R. CIV. P. 23. 
 9. See Robert J. Condlin, “A Formstone of our Federalism”: The Erie/Hanna Doctrine 
& Casebook Law Reform, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 532 (2005) (“Lower federal courts have 
been confused about Erie/Hanna case law for a long time, but now even the Supreme Court 
seems to be in on the confusion.”); Margaret S. Thomas, Constraining the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure Through the Federalism Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 16 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 189 (2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court has created an intricate 
patchwork of ephemeral distinctions and murky exceptions, revealing its own deeply rooted 
discomfort with such displacement of state policymaking.”). 
As for preemption, see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000) (“Most 
commentators who write about preemption agree on at least one thing: Modern preemption 
jurisprudence is a muddle.”). 
 10. Professor Thomas’s excellent article, see Thomas, supra note 9, is one of the few 
works to examine Erie through a preemption lens. Although we share many of the same views, 
her analysis differs from mine in some important details. In common with my approach, she 
believes that the federalism policies employed in preemption cases, in particular the 
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The Article proceeds as follows. First, Part I lays out some basics of Erie, 
examining both the usual treatment of the doctrine in the cases and also some areas 
in which hard questions persist. Part II lays out a similar sketch of preemption. The 
basics having been established, Part III then makes the case for Erie being a 
preemption doctrine. This is most obviously the case when a federal statute or federal 
rule of civil procedure conflicts with state law. But, I will argue, Erie cases are also 
preemption cases when the conflict is between unwritten federal law and state law. I 
will then examine several ways in which looking at Erie cases as preemption cases 
will clarify the analysis. Finally, I will examine the Supreme Court’s most recent 
case on Erie, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.,11 in light 
of the preemption principles I have identified. 
I. SOME BASICS OF ERIE 
This part of the Article sets out the basic contours of Erie as presently understood. 
I call this explication of Erie the “standard account;” to the extent there is “black 
letter” law of Erie, this is it. That being said, this description necessarily 
oversimplifies matters. After setting out the standard account, I will then explain 
some of the difficulties with it. 
A. The Standard Account 
Any case under the Erie doctrine involves a conflict between state and federal law 
in a case before a federal court under diversity jurisdiction.12 The cases under Erie, 
according to the standard account, fall into two categories according to the nature of 
this state-federal conflict. The cases that were first chronologically to come before 
the Court involved a conflict between state law, on the one hand, and federal law not 
contained in a federal statute or written federal rule of civil procedure on the other.13 
Absent a federal rule or statute, these cases perforce involved a conflict between state 
                                                                                                                 
 
presumption against preemption, do and should inform Erie analysis. 
Her approach differs from mine in that it places the preemption analysis within the Rules 
Enabling Act. She argues that Congress did not delegate all of its authority to regulate 
procedure to the Court in the Enabling Act, but instead reserved the power to create rules that 
impinge on state substantive polices. See id. at 243 (“Applying the federalism canons to the 
REA leads to a conclusion that the Court’s rulemaking power is not broad enough to displace 
state procedural rules that are part of a state regulatory scheme addressed to areas Congress 
has left to the states.”). In my analysis, on the other hand, respect for state autonomy is utilized 
in the interpretation of the rule, not assessing its validity. See infra note 400–02 and 
accompanying text. 
 11. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
 12. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon 
to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012) (“Erie analysis is now concerned 
with whether federal or state law should be applied . . . .”). 
 13. See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
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law and federal common (i.e. judge-made) law.14 The Erie case itself is an example.15 
So too is the early case of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.16 The second category consists 
of cases in which the conflicting federal law exists in the form of a statute or federal 
rule of civil (or appellate) procedure.17 
The Supreme Court established this dichotomy in Hanna v. Plumer.18 The dispute 
in Hanna was whether in a diversity action the federal court should apply Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 4,19 which allowed service by leaving process at the 
defendant’s home with a person living there, or state law, which required in-hand 
personal service.20 Earlier cases, most notably Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, had 
established an “outcome determinative” test.21 Under this test, in diversity cases “the 
outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far 
as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State 
court.”22 The argument for state law in Hanna was accordingly based on the York 
test: since the state law that required in-hand service also contained a time limit for 
that service and since that time had run, applying state law would lead to a dismissal, 
whereas under Federal Rule 4, the service was proper and the case could proceed.23 
This difference between state and federal law, it was argued in Hanna, was so 
determinative of the outcome that state law had to be applied.24 
The Court rejected this argument and established the dichotomy between cases in 
which federal law is embodied in a federal rule and those in which it is not.25 The “Erie 
rule,” the Court said, “has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule.”26 While prior 
cases had sometimes involved an arguably relevant rule, according to the Supreme 
Court in each such case the rationale was that the “Federal Rule was not as broad as 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14. See Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and 
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 788 (1986) 
(“Byrd . . . [is] the best refuge for those who assert broad power in the federal courts to apply 
a federal common law of procedure . . . .”). 
 15. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie, state law provided that persons walking along a railroad 
right-of-way are trespassers to whom the railroad owes no tort duty. Id. at 70. There was no 
federal rule or statute to the contrary. 
 16. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). In York, the conflict was between a state statute of limitations and 
the federal common law of laches as a time limit for suit in equity cases. Id. at 101. 
 17. The Supreme Court first indicated the importance of the distinction in Hanna v. Plumer, 
380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965) (holding that Erie “has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule”). 
 18. Id. 
 19. FED. R. CIV. P. 4. 
 20. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 462. 
 21. York, 326 U.S. at 109. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466 (1965) (“[A] determination that the Massachusetts service 
requirements obtain will result in immediate victory for respondent. If, on the other hand, it 
should be held that Rule 4(d)(1) is applicable, the litigation will continue, with possible victory 
for petitioner.”). 
 24. See id. (“Erie, as refined in York, demands that federal courts apply state law 
whenever application of federal law in its stead will alter the outcome of the case.”). 
 25. See id. at 471 (“When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question 
facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice . . . .”). 
 26. Id. at 470. 
1596 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:1591 
 
the losing party urged, and therefore, there being no Federal Rule which covered the 
point in dispute, Erie commanded the enforcement of state law.”27 The Supreme Court 
thus set to one side the mode of analysis of the earlier cases, none of which, according 
to the Court, involved a conflict between state law and a federal rule.28 
According to the Court in Hanna, an attempt to apply cases such as York to the 
issue before it misconceived the problem.29 In cases where there is a federal rule in 
conflict with state law, the federal rule controls, so long as it is in fact a valid federal 
rule; Rule 4 applied because it “neither exceeded the congressional mandate 
embodied in the Rules Enabling Act nor transgressed constitutional bounds, and . . . 
the Rule is therefore the standard against which the District Court should have 
measured the adequacy of the service.”30 As the Court clarified in a later case, a 
federal rule must “be applied if it represents a valid exercise of Congress’ rulemaking 
authority.”31 And to be valid under the Enabling Act, a rule need clear only a low 
hurdle: a federal rule is within the Act so long as it “really regulates procedure.”32 
Thus, under the standard account, the easy cases are ones involving federal rules 
or statutes. Here, the Erie question is a simple application of the Supremacy 
Clause.33 The Rules Enabling Act provides that all “laws in conflict with” the 
federal rules “shall be of no further force or effect.”34 This means, according to 
Hanna,35 that the federal rules supersede the Rules of Decision Act, which 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. But see infra notes 78–97 and accompanying text (arguing that some earlier 
cases did in fact present a conflict between state law and a federal rule). 
 29. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (“When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, 
the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie 
choice . . . .”). 
 30. Id. at 463–64. 
 31. Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987). 
 32. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). 
 33. See Donald L. Doernberg, “The Tempest”: Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. 
v. Allstate Insurance Co.: The Rules Enabling Act Decision That Added to the Confusion—
But Should Not Have, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1147, 1155 (2011) (“With respect to enacted federal 
law—the Constitution, statutes, administrative regulations and the Federal Rules—the 
Supremacy Clause operates as the dispositive weight in the balance, mandating the triumph of 
federal law (even a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure) over any contrary state rule.”); Jennifer 
S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 103, 
114 n.50 (2011) (arguing that even without the Rules of Decision Act directing application of 
federal law, “valid and applicable federal law would preempt state law by virtue of the 
Supremacy Clause”); Mary Kay Kane, The Golden Wedding Year: Erie Railroad Company v. 
Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 674 n.20 (1988) (explaining 
that if a valid federal Rule “conflicts with state law, the Federal Rule controls under the 
Supremacy Clause”); Thomas, supra note 9, at 205 (stating that Hanna’s holding is “a pure 
expression of the Supremacy Clause: where Congress has enacted legislation governing 
diversity actions, the Court must follow it”). 
 34. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). 
 35. This reading of the law by Hanna was endorsed by John Hart Ely in his immensely 
influential article, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 718 (1974): 
Hanna’s main point, however, was that when the application of a Federal Rule 
is at issue, the Rules Enabling Act—and not the Rules of Decision Act as 
construed by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and other cases—should determine whether 
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otherwise provides for the application of state law in certain cases.36 And contrary 
state law (in Hanna, the state law requiring in-hand service of process) is 
preempted by conflicting federal law (the federal rule with its origins in the Rules 
Enabling Act) as well.37 As the Court said in Hanna, “When a situation is covered 
by one of the Federal Rules, . . . the court has been instructed to apply the Federal 
Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and 
Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses 
neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.”38 
It is my contention that Hanna improperly disaggregated Erie, that the earlier 
cases cannot all be explained as holding that “the Federal Rule was not as broad as 
the losing party urged,”39 and that Erie had been invoked to avoid the application of 
a federal rule. It is also my contention that the preemption analysis of Hanna should 
apply whether or not the matter is covered by a federal rule, but there will be more 
on this later. For now, I am continuing with the standard account, and under that 
version of Erie, the preemption analysis governs in situations involving conflict 
between state law and a federal rule or statute and is applicable only in such cases. 
But what of the other category of cases, those in which there was no federal rule 
(or statute) in conflict with state law? The federal law in these cases could be 
characterized as “unwritten federal law” or, more simply, “federal common law.”40 
Here Hanna offered guidance that, despite being dicta,41 has been influential. It 
identified the “twin aims” of Erie as “discouragement of forum-shopping and 
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”42 In Erie cases with no federal 
rule or statute, therefore, one must ask whether applying federal rather than state law 
                                                                                                                 
 
federal or state law is to be applied. . . . [T]his point seems plainly correct. The 
Enabling Act provides that “[a]ll laws in conflict with” Rules promulgated under 
its authority “shall be of no further force or effect,” and the Rules of Decision 
Act is a law. But even if that language were not there, the Enabling Act is much 
more recent . . . . 
 36. The Act provides that the “laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or 
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded 
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they 
apply.” 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012). 
 37. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 470; see supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 40. Federal common law is, among other things, a pejorative term referring to the 
assumption of law-making power by the federal judiciary under the reign of Swift v. Tyson, 41 
U.S. 1, 18 (1842). See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (overruling Swift in part 
because “[t]here is no federal general common law”). But federal common law also refers to 
enclaves of legitimate judge-made law in cases such as Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 
487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) and Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366–67 
(1943), where the strength of federal interests justifies the federal courts in making their own 
law. See generally infra notes 181–200 and accompanying text. 
 41. The Court began the discussion by posing the question of what result would be 
obtained “even if there were no Federal Rule making it clear that in-hand service is not 
required in diversity actions.” Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466. Posing and answering a counterfactual 
question is classic dicta. 
 42. See id. at 468. 
1598 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:1591 
 
would be likely to encourage forum shopping or the inequitable administration of the 
laws.43 On the facts before the Court in Hanna, the difference between service in 
hand, as required by state law, and process being left at the defendant’s home was 
too trivial to actually cause people to forum shop.44 Also, because of this triviality, 
having service under state law in some cases (those in state court) and under federal 
law in others (those in diversity) would not raise any equal protection (“inequitable 
administration of the laws,” as the Court put it) concerns.45 In the end, this test from 
Hanna’s dicta is the York outcome test with a clarification of how divergent the 
outcome under federal law must be in order to require the application of state law. 
The Hanna dicta has frequently been cited and applied by the Court in subsequent 
cases.46 Less frequently mentioned is the analysis used in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural 
Elec. Coop., Inc.47 In Byrd, the Erie issue was the applicability of a state law that 
made a certain factual issue a matter to be decided by the judge rather than the jury.48 
As against this state law, there was no contrary federal rule or statute; rather, state 
law conflicted with an unwritten federal practice that disputed facts are ordinarily 
decided by the jury.49 Byrd posed three questions for analysis: First, what is the 
nature of the state law? Is it “bound up with” state-created “rights and obligations”50 
or merely a rule of “form and mode?”51 If the state law is bound up with the definition 
of rights and obligations under state law, one should apply state law, as it is 
substantive in the Erie sense.52 Second, if on the other hand the state rule is one 
merely of form or mode, one should still apply it if it has a significant enough effect 
on the outcome of the litigation. Thus, Byrd incorporates the outcome test of York. 
Third, the analysis in Byrd adds an additional strand not found in York. Whatever 
degree of effect on the outcome exists, the policy of cases having the same outcome 
in federal diversity and in state courts must be balanced against “countervailing 
considerations”53 of “federal policy.”54 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945) (holding at the lower court 
that a “federal district court . . . is not required to apply the State statute of limitations,” despite 
the absence of any different federal statute of limitations). 
 44. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 416, 428 (1996) (referring 
to the “twin aims” of Erie identified in Hanna); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 
39 (1988) (“In deciding what is substantive and what is procedural for these purposes, we have 
adhered to a functional test based on the ‘twin aims of the Erie rule’ . . . .”). 
 47. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
 48. See id. at 533–34. 
 49. See id. at 537. Byrd was not a Seventh Amendment right-to-a-jury-trial case. The 
Court specifically disavowed direct reliance on the Seventh Amendment. See id. at 537 n.10. 
Of course if the Seventh Amendment did directly apply—that is, if it gave a right to a jury trial 
in the matter at hand—then any Erie analysis would be obviated. The Seventh Amendment 
itself would displace state law. 
 50. Id. at 534–35. 
 51. See id. at 536. 
 52. See id. at 535–36. 
 53. Id. at 537. 
 54. Id. at 538. 
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Since Hanna involved a conflict between state law and a written federal rule, 
between the two cases, Byrd should be more authoritative on conflicts with unwritten 
federal law because Hanna has but dicta on that issue.55 And it is not just a matter of 
semantics: Hanna’s dicta simply asks about the degree of potential difference in the 
outcome. Byrd agrees that this is a factor but allows concern about differences in 
outcome to be offset by federal policy. There is no similar place for “countervailing 
considerations” under Hanna’s dicta.56 
Several post-Hanna cases deal with conflicts between state law and a federal rule 
or statute. For example, Burlington Northern Railroad Co., v. Woods57 held that 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3858 conflicted with an Alabama statute 
mandating a ten percent penalty upon the unsuccessful appeal of a money judgment.59 
And Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.60 held that the federal statute on 
transfers between district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1404,61 conflicted with state law.62 More 
recently, in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates. v. Allstate Insurance. Co.,63 the Court 
dealt with a conflict between state law and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2364 on 
class actions. These cases thus appropriately employ the holding of Hanna. 
But other post-Hanna cases involve, or at least the Court thought they involved, 
a clash between state law and unwritten federal law and yet follow Hanna’s dicta 
more than Byrd’s holding. For example, in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,65 state law 
provided that a complaint had to be filed and process served within the time provided 
by the statute of limitations. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 provides that a “civil 
action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”66 Walker held that Rule 
3 was inapposite: “There is no indication that the Rule was intended to toll a state 
statute of limitations, much less that it purported to displace state tolling rules for 
purposes of state statutes of limitations.”67 Assuming that the Court is correct and 
that Rule 3 was inapplicable to the case, 68 one is left with state law conflicting with 
some federal law that, per the Court’s analysis, is not embodied in a rule or statute. 
Despite Byrd having a holding on this and Hanna having only dicta, the Court in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. See Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 987, 1001 (2011) (noting that this portion of Hanna is dicta). 
 56. See id. (rejecting the view that “Byrd’s balancing of state and federal interests did not 
survive Hanna”). 
 57. 480 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 58. See FED. R. APP. P. 38. 
 59. See Burlington N. R.R., 480 U.S. at 7. 
 60. 487 U.S. 22 (1998). 
 61. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). 
 62. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. at 28–32. 
 63. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
 64. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 65. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
 66. See FED. R. CIV. P. 3. 
 67. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750–51. 
 68. I have argued elsewhere that the Court erred in construing Rule 3 to be inapplicable. 
See Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Hanna’s Unruly Family: An Opinion for Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates v. Allstate Insurance, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 89 (2010). 
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Walker failed to even cite Byrd and instead used a Hanna (dicta) analysis focusing 
on the “twin aims” of Erie.69 
It was not until Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.70 in 199671 that the Court 
again delivered a holding on Erie not involving a federal rule or statute. Again, the 
dicta from Hanna held sway. The case involved a state law that expanded the grounds 
upon which a state court of appeals could reduce a jury verdict as excessive.72 
Although, according to the Court, no federal rule addressed the standard to be 
employed,73 it turned to Hanna’s dicta and not Byrd: the question was whether state 
law is “outcome affective in . . . ‘that failure to apply it [in federal court] would 
unfairly discriminate . . . or be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal 
court.’”74 
Thus, the standard account of Erie provides as follows: 
•  If the conflict is between state law and a federal rule or a federal 
statute, apply the federal rule if it is valid. 
•  If the conflict involves unwritten federal law, either 
 • apply the Hanna dicta test, which asks if differences in outcome 
under state versus federal law are significant enough to lead to 
forum-shopping or to inequitable outcomes of otherwise identical 
cases, the one in state court, the other in federal court; or 
 • apply the Byrd test, which asks the same question about 
differences in outcome, but allows that concern to be outweighed 
by other federal policies. 
B. Recurrent Problems Under the Standard Account 
Black letter law provides useful capsule summaries but in some instances 
misleads by creating an appearance of orderliness when none in fact exists. Stating a 
rule is one thing, but seeing how courts apply the rule to facts before it is another, 
less tidy, enterprise. Such is the situation with the cases under the standard account 
of the Erie doctrine. While one might identify additional recurring problems, I will 
set out what I believe are the three most problematic. First, the case law gives no 
consistent guidance on how to interpret federal rules when determining whether they 
apply and thus perhaps conflict with state law. Second, the case law is inconsistent 
on how to determine whether an applicable federal rule really conflicts with state 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 753 (“It is sufficient to note that although in this case failure to 
apply the state service law might not create any problem of forum shopping, the result would be 
an ‘inequitable administration’ of the law.” (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965))). 
 70. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 71. Byrd was a 1958 decision, Hanna was decided in 1964, and Walker dates from 1980. 
See Walker, 446 U.S. at 740; Hanna, 380 U.S. at 460; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 
Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
 72. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 423. 
 73. Justice Scalia disagreed, finding the governing standard in Rule 59 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at 467–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 428 (alteration added) (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468). 
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law. Third, the Court has never successfully explained how to answer the primordial 
Erie question of how to define state laws that must be honored as “substantive.” 
1. Does a Federal Rule Conflict with State Law? How Are We To Read the Rules? 
The entire enterprise under the standard account turns upon whether the 
conflicting federal law is a federal rule or statute or is an unwritten federal law. One 
might imagine it a relatively simple thing to determine whether a federal rule applies 
to a given matter that is the subject of an Erie dispute, but it turns out to be otherwise. 
Sometimes the Court gives a narrow interpretation to federal rules that would seem, 
on their face, to be applicable.75 As a result, the Hanna holding, with its near 
automatic indication of federal law applying over state law, is avoided. On the other 
hand, other cases seem to reach out to rope into the case a federal rule or statute that 
is less than obviously relevant.76 This results in the avoidance of state law because 
once it is determined that a federal rule or statute is applicable, it is an all but forgone 
conclusion that the federal rule or statue will apply.77 In short, the standard account’s 
emphasis on applying federal rules in Erie cases poorly explains the cases. 
The chief examples of cases reading federal rules narrowly are Ragan v. 
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.78 and Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.79 When 
the Court in Hanna said (in 1965) that Erie had never been used to void a federal 
rule, but instead in some earlier cases the “Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing 
party urged,”80 it was thinking of Ragan, a 1949 case.81 Ragan had held that state 
law, not Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, governs in diversity cases to determine 
what must be done (mere filing of the complaint or also service upon the defendant) 
before the expiration of the statute of limitations.82 Now, saying this of Ragan—that 
it decided that the rule was not as broad as contended—is one way to line up an 
earlier case with the new learning of Hanna, but it does not make it true. Ragan 
did not textually analyze Federal Rule 3 and find it inapplicable; instead, it 
analyzed the issue under the then-prevailing test of York, asking what effect on the 
outcome is created by the variance between state and federal law.83 Since the 
change in outcome was great—dismissal for failure to meet the statute of 
limitations or continuation of the case—state law had to apply.84 State law applied, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. See infra notes 83–102 and accompanying text. 
 76. See infra notes 103–11 and accompanying text. 
 77. The only remaining question is whether the rule is valid as within the scope of the 
Rules Enabling Act. The standard of validity under the Act is exceedingly low. See supra note 
32 and accompanying text. 
 78. 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
 79. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
 80. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965).  
 81. See id. at 470 & n.12. 
 82. See Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531 & n.1. 
 83. See id. at 532 (“Erie . . . was premised on the theory that in diversity cases the rights 
enjoyed under local law should not vary because enforcement of those rights was sought in 
the federal court rather than in the state court. If recovery could not be had in the state court, 
it should be denied in the federal court.”). 
 84. See Rensberger, supra note 68, at 91. 
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said the Court in Ragan, because “[i]f recovery could not be had in the state court, 
it should be denied in the federal court.”85 
We could simply regard Ragan as an elderly and atavistic relative who 
embarrasses us at family gatherings but who is largely ignored because he is seldom 
present. But well after Hanna’s creation of the standard account, the Ragan issue 
came up again in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.86 Walker gives Ragan a second, 
post-Hanna, birth. It posed exactly the same issue as Ragan.87 The cases were so 
close on the facts that the chief argument for applying federal law was to overrule 
Ragan in light of Hanna.88 The Court declined to do so, doubling down on Hanna’s 
statement that Federal Rule 3 did not cover the statute of limitations issue.89 Instead, 
“Rule 3 governs the date from which various timing requirements of the Federal 
Rules begin to run.”90 The problem with this characterization of Rule 3 is that there 
are no timing requirements that are triggered by Rule 3’s statement that “a civil 
action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”91 The time for pleadings, 
for example, runs from the date of service, not filing.92 
Another example of the narrow reading of a federal rule is Gasperini v. Center 
for Humanities, Inc.93 The question there involved the applicability of a state law in 
a diversity case that allowed an appellate court to reduce damages found by a jury 
when the award “deviate[d] materially from what would be reasonable 
compensation.”94 One could read Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59,95 which 
allowed the grant of new trials “for any of the reasons for which new trials have 
heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States,”96 as 
applicable and in conflict with state law. Justice Scalia so read Rule 59, but he wrote 
in dissent.97 Thus, the Court ignored Rule 59 despite an at least plausible argument 
for its application. 
On other occasions the Court has reached to find a rule that is not obviously 
relevant. In Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,98 the Court held that the 
federal statute that generally governs transfers between federal courts, 28 U.S.C. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 532. 
 86. 446 U.S. 740, 743–53 (1980). 
 87. See id. at 748 (“The present case is indistinguishable from Ragan.”). 
 88. See id. at 749. 
 89. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965) (“It is true that there have been cases 
where this Court has held applicable a state rule in the face of an argument that the situation 
was governed by one of the Federal Rules. But the holding of each such case was not that Erie 
commanded displacement of a Federal Rule by an inconsistent state rule, but rather that the 
scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged . . . .”); see also id. at 470 
n.12 (citing Ragan, 337 U.S. at 530, as one such case). 
 90. Walker, 446 U.S. at 751. 
 91. FED. R. CIV. P. 3. 
 92. See Rensberger, supra note 68, at 92. 
 93. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 94. Id. at 418 (citing N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW AND RULES § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995)). 
 95. FED. R. CIV. P. 59. 
 96. The text of Rule 59 has insubstantially changed. The quote is from the version of Rule 
59 in existence at the time. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 417. 
 97. See id. at 467–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 98. 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
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§ 1404,99 was applicable and controlled under Hanna as against a state law that 
generally voided contractual forum selection clauses.100 The federal statute says 
nothing about forum selection clauses or their enforceability. The pertinent portion 
of the statute reads in whole, “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the 
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district 
or division where it might have been brought.”101 Similarly, in Burlington Northern 
Railroad Co. v. Woods,102 the Court read Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 
as conflicting with an Alabama statute that required a ten percent penalty upon a 
money judgment that was unsuccessfully appealed.103 This conflict was not 
inevitable; Rule 38 deals with frivolous appeals, allowing a penalty for such 
appeals as a matter of discretion.104 The Alabama statute governed all losing 
appeals, frivolous or not.105 The Court could have allowed the Alabama statute to 
apply to all losing appeals and then have Rule 38 also provide for a discretionary 
additional penalty if the appeal was frivolous.106 
In short, one cannot simply say that a textually applicable and valid federal rule 
applies over state law. Some apparently applicable, or at least plausibly applicable, 
rules have not applied under Erie. Since those rules were no doubt valid—that is the 
rules are within the scope of power delegated under the Rules Enabling Act107—if 
we are to keep Hanna the only possible conclusion is that the Court is employing 
some canon of construction108 to decide not that a federal rule is invalid but instead 
that it was not intended to apply. Initially, the Court denied giving the rules anything 
other than their plain meaning even as it was engaging in this sleight of hand. In 
Walker, the Court denied that the rules “are to be narrowly construed in order to 
avoid a ‘direct collision’ with state law. The Federal Rules should be given their plain 
meaning.”109 But eventually, the Court admitted that “Federal courts have interpreted 
the Federal Rules . . . with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory 
policies.”110 Thus, the standard account has another layer, one that was at first covert 
and is now overt. A valid federal rule trumps conflicting state law only if it is 
applicable. A rule is applicable only if the drafters intended it to apply to the situation 
and that interpretation is to be made with an eye toward Erie policies. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 99. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012). 
 100. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30–32. 
 101. Id. at 29 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). 
 102. 480 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 103. Id. at 6–7. 
 104. FED. R. APP. P. 38 (“If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may 
. . . award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.”). 
 105. See Burlington, 480 U.S. at 3. 
 106. See Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Reassessing the Avoidance Canon in Erie Cases, 44 
AKRON L. REV. 1067, 1101 (2011) (“The Burlington Northern Court reached out to find a 
conflict where none was necessary . . . .”). 
 107. On the test for validity under the Rules Enabling Act, see supra note 32 and 
accompanying text. 
 108. See Genetin, supra note 106, at 1093–103; Thomas, supra note 9. 
 109. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980). 
 110. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996). 
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As the Court now puts it, under Erie, the “first question” is “whether the scope of 
the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court.”111 
Basic Erie policies, such as avoidance of forum-shopping, uniformity of result, and 
respect for state lawmaking, seem to influence the process of interpretation.112 As 
Justice Ginsburg said, “[W]e have avoided immoderate interpretations of the Federal 
Rules that would trench on state prerogatives without serving any countervailing 
federal interest.”113 This makes every Erie case a hard one. One cannot carve out 
cases involving a federal rule as easy ones because the predicate question of whether 
there is a pertinent federal rule—one intended to apply—cannot be answered without 
wading into “Erie’s murky waters.”114 
2. How To Differentiate State Laws That Conflict with a Federal Rule from 
State Laws That Supplement Federal Rules 
The first step under the standard account is to determine if a federal rule or statute 
is in conflict with state law. The preceding Part addressed the problem of how to 
determine if a federal rule is applicable at all to the matter at hand. A related problem 
is how to determine whether an applicable federal rule conflicts with state law. In 
many situations, the difference between state and federal law does not present an 
either-or choice; rather, one could apply both.115 One could view state law as 
applying supplemental requirements in addition to those required by the federal rule. 
Or, instead, if state law requires something be done and the relevant federal rule does 
not require it, should we read the silence in the federal rule as an affirmative 
statement that no additional requirements are to be imposed? 
The Court has given various descriptions of the nature of the conflict that is 
required for supersession of state law by a federal rule: a valid federal rule will apply 
if the federal rule and state law are in “direct collision.”116 The federal rule will apply 
if “the clash is unavoidable.”117 The federal rule will apply if it is “sufficiently broad 
to control the issue.”118 This “control” may be “implicit[].”119 Whatever the precision 
the Court has implied, application of these concepts to actual cases and facts reveals 
the room for uncertainty. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. Walker, 446 U.S. at 749–50. 
 112. See Thomas, supra note 9, at 207 (“Thus, even after Hanna, the Court continued to 
account for federalism concerns by examining the state policy purpose underlying the law being 
displaced, and by using creative interpretive approaches to avoid applying particular Rules.”). 
 113. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 439 (2010) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id. at 398 (majority opinion). 
 115. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987) (rejecting an argument 
that “a federal court sitting in diversity could impose the mandatory penalty [under state law] 
and likewise remain free to exercise its discretionary authority under Federal Rule 38”); Cohen 
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 556 (1949) (holding that a Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure did not “conflict with the statute in question and all may be observed by a 
federal court” along with the Federal Rule). 
 116. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). 
 117. Id. at 470. 
 118. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 (1980). 
 119. Burlington, 480 U.S. at 5. 
2015] ERIE AND PREEMPTION 1605 
 
Suppose that a federal rule speaks to a matter and contains procedural 
requirements A, B, and C while state law requires those plus an additional procedural 
step D. Does the federal rule conflict with state law? If the federal rule said in so 
many words that A, B, and C, and only A, B, and C are required, the matter would 
be clear: the rule was meant to be exhaustive. But, it is more likely that the rule is 
not so specific. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., state law required 
plaintiffs in derivative actions to file a bond to secure liability for costs.120 The rule 
covering derivative actions (at that time Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23) had no 
requirement of a bond.121 The Court found that Rule 23 was not in “conflict with the 
statute in question.”122 One could apply both the requirements of Rule 23 and of that 
state law, with state law imposing supplemental burdens on the plaintiff.123 
By itself, this decision is neither inevitable nor implausible. But why did that 
reasoning not apply in Burlington Northern Railroad Co., v. Woods?124 In 
Burlington, a state statute required a penalty upon all unsuccessful appeals of money 
judgments; federal law allowed but did not require penalties if the appeal was 
frivolous.125 The Court in Burlington found a conflict on the reasoning that Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, by specifying discretionary penalties in frivolous 
cases, also meant to prohibit any other kind of award.126 Silence in the federal rule 
was here read as a rejection of any additional procedural requirements on the same 
topic. Or why was the Cohen approach of allowing state law to supplement a federal 
rule not taken in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.?127 There the Court held 
that the federal statute on transfers between district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1404, which 
treats a contractual forum selection clause as a factor to be considered in the district 
court’s discretionary decision to transfer, conflicted with state law that categorically 
rejected forum selection clauses.128 One could harmonize the two holdings by saying 
that if there is a forum selection clause, the court may consider it a factor under 
§ 1404. But whether there is, in fact, a valid forum selection clause is a matter of the 
state law of contracts (because the state law sets aside a written forum selection 
clause on the grounds of unequal bargaining power or a contract of adhesion). One 
could also make the argument for state law supplementing federal law in Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Associates. v. Allstate Insurance Co., where the Court found a 
conflict between state law and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s treatment of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 120. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 541. 
 121. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Derivative actions are now governed by FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1. 
 122. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 556. 
 123. See id. at 556 (no provisions of the Federal Rules “conflict with the statute in question 
and all may be observed by a federal court”). 
 124. Burlington, 480 U.S. at 1; see supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text. 
 125. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 126. See Burlington, 480 U.S. at 7 (“[T]he Rule's discretionary mode of operation 
unmistakably conflicts with the mandatory provision of Alabama's affirmance penalty statute.”). 
 127. 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
 128. Id. at 29–30. The Court was rather vague on the exact content of the state law. At one 
point it said that the state law “looks unfavorably upon contractual forum-selection clauses,” 
id. at 24, implying that they might be enforced in some cases. But elsewhere it characterized 
state law as having a “categorical policy disfavoring forum-selection clauses,” id. at 30, 
implying that forum-selection clauses were never entitled to any weight under state law. 
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class actions.129 State law forbade a class action if the claim was for a statutory 
penalty.130 The Court found this to be in conflict with Rule 23, the procedural 
requirements of which did not contain a prohibition on statutory penalty claims.131 
But the Court could have read the two as complementary: state law supplied an 
additional requirement—no penalty could be recovered—that would apply in 
addition to the remainder of Rule 23. 
The point is not that any of these cases are wrong. I happen to agree with most of 
the results.132 Instead, the point is that the cases have not identified a way in which 
to define when a “conflict” exists. It obviously exists in cases such as Hanna, where 
state law expressly forbade what federal law expressly allowed. A conflict could also 
exist, however, when dual compliance is possible, as in Cohen or Burlington. One of 
these two cases found a conflict, the other did not. In short, the standard account 
gives us no protocol for making this classification. It gives us a taxonomy without a 
test to differentiate between categories. 
3. Determining What Laws Are “Substantive” 
Under the standard account, if no federal rule or statute is in play, one must apply 
state “substantive” law.133 The Court has failed to develop consistent and useful tests 
for classifying state law as either substantive or procedural. 
The Erie case itself gives no guidance on how to make this determination. This is 
not surprising since Erie “dealt with a question which was ‘substantive’ in every 
traditional sense (whether the railroad owed a duty of care to Tompkins as a 
trespasser or a licensee).”134 At times, as in York,135 the Court has appeared to define 
“substantive” as that which is not procedural: any rule that significantly affects the 
outcome defines what the result of the litigation is and is thus substantive; on the 
other hand, if the rule does not significantly affect the outcome but merely tells a 
court how to arrive at that outcome, it is procedural.136 At other times, as in Hanna, 
the Court has used the outcome test not as a means to protect the efficacy of state 
substantive law as an end in itself but instead as a means to achieve harmonious 
state-federal relations—applying state substantive (i.e. outcome-effecting) law will 
avoid forum shopping and inequitable administration of the law.137 On the other 
hand, the Court in Byrd was in fact concerned with protecting state autonomy, in 
particular the ability of states to create and define “rights and obligations” between 
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
 130. Id. at 397. 
 131. Id. at 398–99. 
 132. My exception would be Shady Grove. See Rensberger, supra note 68. 
 133. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958) (“It was 
decided in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins that the federal courts in diversity cases must respect the 
definition of state-created rights and obligations by the state courts. We must, therefore, first 
examine the [state law in question] to determine whether it is bound up with these rights and 
obligations in such a way that its application in the federal court is required.”). 
 134. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). 
 135. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
 136. See id. 
 137. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
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private parties.138 Federal courts in diversity cases “must respect” state laws that are 
“bound up with these rights and obligations.”139 Some cases give heed to state 
interests or policies, some do not.140 Some cases direct courts to also consider federal 
interests,141 some do not.142 
Putting Erie in its proper preemption context will enable courts to understand 
better these recurring hard Erie questions and deal with them more consistently. The 
following Part gives an outline of the preemption doctrine. 
II. SOME BASICS OF PREEMPTION 
This Part sets out some of the basics of preemption. The law of preemption is a 
deep well whose waters are dark and turbulent. For our purposes, however, it is only 
necessary to draw from near the surface. In brief, preemption is a matter of 
determining the intent of Congress to override state law.143 This intent may be 
directly expressed in legislation or it may be implied.144 
A. The Preemption Taxonomy: The Categories of Preemption 
Preemption is one doctrine with three subtypes. All categories of the preemption 
doctrine derive from the Supremacy Clause145: “The underlying rationale of the 
pre-emption doctrine . . . is that the Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that 
‘interfere with or are contrary to, the laws of congress.’”146 Preemption thus gives teeth 
                                                                                                                 
 
 138. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Erie itself stressed the importance of “preserv[ing] the autonomy and independence 
of the States.” Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). In later cases, one finds this 
concern voiced outside the majority opinion. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474–75 (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (“Erie recognized that there should not be two conflicting systems of law 
controlling the primary activity of citizens . . . . And it recognized that the scheme of our 
Constitution envisions an allocation of law-making functions between state and federal 
legislative processes which is undercut if the federal judiciary can make substantive law 
affecting state affairs beyond the bounds of congressional legislative powers in this regard.”). 
 141. Byrd made relevant to the calculus the presence of “countervailing [federal] 
considerations.” See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537; see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 
518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996). 
 142. See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28 (1988) (The Court decided 
the applicability in diversity of a federal venue provision without relying on federal interest in 
venue. In fact, the Court stated its disagreement with the Court of Appeals’ reliance on “a 
significant federal interest in questions of venue.”). 
 143. See infra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 144. See infra notes 152–57 and accompanying text. 
 145. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges 
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 146. Chicago & Nw. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981) 
(quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)); see also Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan 
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to the power of Congress to declare law unfettered by state pronouncements. “The 
Supremacy Clause provides a clear rule that federal law ‘shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land . . . .’ Under this principle, Congress has the power to preempt state law.”147 
The ability of Congress to override state laws, so long as Congress constrains 
itself to an area of federal legislative competence,148 is uncontroversial, having been 
established in 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden.149 Since congressional power is undoubted, 
the only question in any preemption case is whether Congress has exercised that 
power. Thus, preemption in any form is a question of congressional intent.150 Within 
this common rationale, however, are several discrete types of preemption.151 
On occasion, Congress speaks expressly to the intended effect of its legislation, 
saying in so many words that state laws in conflict are preempted: this is known as 
“express preemption.”152 Even with an express preemption provision, however, it is 
necessary to construe Congress’ express provision. Did Congress intend to preempt 
this particular state law? The question becomes one of the “scope” of the preemption 
provision.153 Commentators disagree whether in making this determination of scope 
there is or ought to be a presumption against preemption or a deference to state 
lawmaking in areas traditionally dominated by state law.154 
Even when Congress has not explicitly declared conflicting state laws preempted, 
the Court may find implied preemption, which, in turn, has two subtypes. First, “state 
law must yield to a congressional Act . . . . [w]hen Congress intends federal law to 
‘occupy the field.’”155 In such cases, “[t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so 
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
States to supplement it.”156 Relevant to field preemption is the existence of a 
“dominant federal interest in [the] field.”157 
Second, even absent broad federal regulation that encompasses the entire field, 
“state law is naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal 
                                                                                                                 
 
Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982) (“The pre-emption doctrine . . . has its roots 
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art. VI, cl. 2). 
 148. Of course preemption, while powerful, is naturally limited by the limitations on 
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 149. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1. 
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 153. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 443 (2005) (emphasis omitted). 
 154. See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, The “New” Presumption Against Preemption, 61 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1217 (2010); Dinh, supra note 148, at 2091. 
 155. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372. 
 156. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 157. Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985). 
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statute.”158 Conflict preemption has two additional subcategories. It exists if it is 
“impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal law.”159 Conflict 
preemption will also be found when dual compliance is possible but “under the 
circumstances” state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”160 
These preemption doctrines provide useful tools for an Erie analysis. I shall 
explain how certain of their strands are in fact woven into the Erie cases and how a 
more explicit reliance on them could aid in Erie analysis. But before arriving at that 
destination, we need to first cement the relationship between Erie and preemption. 
III. RECASTING THE ERIE DOCTRINE AS A PREEMPTION PROBLEM 
The previous discussion of the standard account of the Erie doctrine and 
preemption is, I hope, at least suggestive of a link between the two. The clearest 
connection to preemption lies in the Hanna line of Erie problems. In Erie cases of 
this type, courts displace state law with a federal rule or statute, doing so on the 
ground that they have been “instructed” to follow federal law by Congress (through 
its delegation to the Advisory Committee).161 Perhaps less clear is the connection 
between preemption and Erie cases in which there is no written federal rule or statute 
(the “non-Hanna” line of cases). But, as will be shown below, these cases too should 
be understood as involving preemption. 
This Part of the Article will first cement what it previously suggested—the 
correspondence of the Hanna type of Erie cases to preemption as a matter of theory. 
It will then turn to preemption and non-Hanna Erie cases (those not involving written 
federal law) demonstrating that a similar linkage between the doctrines exists there 
as well. Indeed, as we examine the details of the Erie doctrine in the latter type of 
case, we will find several counterparts to existing preemption doctrine. Thus, the 
linkage to preemption is not just as a matter of theory but of practice as well. 
A. Conflicts Between State Law and Federal Rules or Federal Statutes as 
Preemption Cases 
Under the standard account of Erie, when a conflict exists between state law and 
a federal rule or a federal statute, one is categorically to apply the federal law, 
assuming the rule or statute to be otherwise valid and also that the issue is within the 
intended scope of the federal rule or federal statute.162 The Supreme Court itself has 
made clear that this type of Erie issue—the Hanna strand of Erie—is a matter of 
preemption: “When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules . . . the court 
has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule . . . .”163 As Justice Scalia put it in his 
                                                                                                                 
 
 158. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 161. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
 162. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 399 
(2010) (because state law and the Federal Rule “attempt[] to answer the same question . . . 
[state law] cannot apply in diversity suits unless Rule 23 is ultra vires”). 
 163. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. 
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opinion in the Shady Grove case, any valid federal rule, that is, one that “‘really 
regulates procedure,’ . . . will pre-empt a conflicting state rule.”164 Commentators 
agree that this strand of Hanna is a matter of preemption: under Hanna, “a direct 
collision of federal and state law effectively results in preemption of the state law.”165 
This conclusion follows from the nature of the Erie issue, the nature of 
preemption, and the structure of federalism. As the Court said in Erie, “Except in 
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be 
applied in any case is the law of the State.”166 This understanding of the sources of 
American law places state law as the default. Federal law, in contrast, comes into 
play as an exception. Reordering the elements referenced in the quote clarifies this 
point: “in any case, the law to be applied is the law of the state” unless the matter is 
“governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress.” Of course there is a 
technical error in the Court’s arrangement of state and federal law. Alongside the 
reference to law provided by the “Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress” should 
be a reference to legitimate federal common law. There is a federal common law, 
albeit not a “general” one, and it has the power to displace state law.167 But subject 
to this minor emendation, the principle expressed in Erie remains true. State law is 
the default, the baseline, and federal law is the exception.168 As Donald Doernberg 
has explained, the default arrangement of state law has its origins in our 
constitutional history: 
The post-colonial nation began with only the law that the states used. As 
federal law developed, some of it displaced state law. One may view the 
Constitution, particularly [the specifications of Congress’ powers in] 
Article I, Section 8, as a statement to the newly formed federal 
government to the effect of “these are the areas in which you may 
displace state law.” Thus, one should begin analyzing any vertical 
choice-of-law problem by presuming that state law applies. The 
presumption is rebuttable, to be sure, but state law is the starting point.169 
                                                                                                                 
 
 164. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 414 n.13. 
 165. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Federal Courts, Practice & Procedure: Reverse-Erie, 
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 169. Donald L. Doernberg, The Unseen Track of Erie Railroad: Why History and 
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611, 645 (2007). 
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In an Erie case, then, one starts with state law, which applies unless and until 
displaced by federal law. If there is a pertinent federal rule or statute (or, as we shall 
see, common law), the displacement occurs. This displacement of state law by federal 
is in fact the same phenomenon as preemption. Erie thus rests in part on a doctrine 
of “residual sovereignty” of the states.170 
To be sure, cases applying the Hanna line of the Erie doctrine often do more than 
mechanically consider whether a federal rule or statute exists and then woodenly 
apply one if found; as noted above,171 there is considerable play in the joints. Over 
time, the Court has come to explicitly acknowledge that one must construe 
potentially applicable federal rules and statutes before concluding that they displace 
state law.172 But this additional analysis is not inconsistent with characterizing Erie 
analysis as preemption. As will be shown below, the Court’s actual mode of analysis 
is in fact consistent with preemption precisely because it engages in an interpretive 
exercise before deciding to apply federal law. 
To these matters we shall return. But first, it is useful to examine preemption and 
the other branch of the Erie doctrine, the “relatively unguided”173 choice between 
state law and federal unwritten (i.e. common) law. 
B. Conflicts Between State Law and Unwritten Federal Law as Preemption Cases 
Cases under Erie in which the federal law is not embodied in a statute or federal 
rule are less commonly thought of as involving preemption, but they inevitably do. 
If there exists no federal statute or rule (or constitutional provision) pertaining to the 
issue at hand but there is in fact some federal law, then perforce the federal law must 
be federal common law. And federal common law has the same preemptive power 
as federal statutory or rule-based law.174 Thus, if a federal court applies an unwritten 
federal standard as against state law under Erie, it is using the federal (judge-made 
or common law) standard to preempt the state law. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 170. See Calvin R. Massey, The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment and Its Implications for 
State Constitutional Law, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1229, 1254 (1990) (quoting Calvin R. Massey, 
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 171. See supra notes 107–13 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text; see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for 
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The Hanna dichotomy175—that Erie cases always involve a choice between, on 
the one hand, state law and federal statutory or rule-based law or, on the other, 
between state law and federal judge-made law—overlooks a third category of Erie 
cases, a category exemplified by the Erie case itself. Since Erie, the solution to such 
cases has become so obvious that they are little discussed within the Erie doctrine. 
But remembering the issue serves to clarify the array of possible Erie issues and to 
introduce the analysis of preemption of state law by unwritten federal law. This third 
category consists of cases in which a party argues that federal law displaces state 
law, but it is revealed that no federal law actually exists.176 Such decisions are thus 
not a choice between state law and federal law (of any type) because the conclusion 
is that there is no federal law to choose. This accurately describes the Erie case itself. 
The rationale of that case was not that there was a federal law concerning persons 
walking along customary footpaths next to railroad tracks and that this federal law 
did not apply as against state law; instead, the ruling was that there was no such 
federal law at all. Congress lacks power to create rules of decision on matters of 
general common law.177 The federal judiciary has no greater power.178 And so, as 
noted above,179 there being no law to displace it, state law applies by default. 
Such cases no longer arise today as Erie issues. Erie put a spike in the heart of 
the general federal common law that had previously existed. Erie is now so basic 
to our understanding of federalism that no litigant argues for a general federal 
common law, no lower court accepts such an argument, and consequently there are 
no appellate decisions treating this aspect of the Erie doctrine. But there are cases 
today concerning federal common law where, as in Erie, the question is whether 
federal law exists.180 
Despite Erie’s admonition,181 federal common law of course does exist. It is 
simply not the wayward, free-roaming, untethered common law that had previously 
existed. Federal courts do not have the authority to make rules of decision for broad 
issues of tort and contract and property. But they do have the authority to make rules 
regulating court operations (procedural rules) and also to make rules of decision 
                                                                                                                 
 
 175. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943). See generally Curtis A. 
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(substantive rules) in certain federal enclaves.182 As examples of federal common 
law controlling procedural matters, federal courts have the “inherent power to impose 
sanctions for . . . bad-faith conduct” by litigants appearing before them.183 This power 
exists independent of statutory authorization.184 Despite the fact “that no federal 
textual provision addresses the claim-preclusive effect of a federal-court 
judgment,”185 federal common law controls the preclusive effect of federal court 
judgments,186 whether the judgment was in a federal question case187 or in a diversity 
case.188 Forum non conveniens is another example of a procedural federal common 
law rule. Federal courts dismiss under their own authority cases that are significantly 
inconvenient even when a federal venue statute indicates the forum chosen is 
proper.189 Forum non conveniens thus amounts to a “federal common-law venue 
rule.”190 Finally, “whether a question is one of law or fact, and the correlative 
decision whether appellate review shall be searching or modest,” is a matter of 
federal common law.191 
Federal common law also extends to matters of substance. A government 
contractor’s liability for defective product designs implicates “uniquely federal 
interests,”192 and so is governed by “federal law of a content prescribed (absent 
explicit statutory directive) by the courts—so-called ‘federal common law.’”193 
Congress occasionally all but expressly asks the federal courts to create a substantive 
federal common law, most famously in the Labor Management Relations Act,194 in 
which it created subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate claims under collective 
bargaining agreements but provided no rules of decision applicable to such 
contracts.195 In such cases, “the substantive law to apply . . . is federal law, which the 
courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.”196 Federal common 
law also governs in nuisance cases brought by one state against another for 
pollution.197 Federal common law may also govern when the United States is a party 
                                                                                                                 
 
 182. See infra notes 198–207 and accompanying text. 
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 196. Id. at 456. 
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to litigation concerning some action of the United States in one of its “proprietary 
transactions,”198 such as acquiring real property199 or issuing commercial paper.200 
The question of federal common law does not arise as an Erie issue today. The 
question in the cases noted above is not a choice between federal and state law (Erie), 
but instead is the more fundamental question of the existence of federal (common) 
law. The Court in such cases addresses whether there is a reason to recognize federal 
common law; if the Court concludes that federal common law exists, there is no 
question of federal common law failing to supersede state law.201 Indeed, a key factor 
in finding that federal common law exists is precisely the need to overcome state law 
that may pose obstacles to the achievement of federal interests. Thus, federal 
common law will exist only when there is “a ‘significant conflict’ . . . between an 
identifiable ‘federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law,’ or the 
application of state law would ‘frustrate specific objectives’ of federal legislation.”202 
Recognizing the existence of federal common law is a matter of “exclusion of state 
authority.”203 If federal common law exists, it is “a question . . . upon which neither 
the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive.”204 Thus, the question 
of recognizing federal common law is one of “displacement of state law.”205 
This preemption model fits with the non-Hanna branch of Erie. A federal court 
in diversity that applies a judge-made federal standard on a “procedural” issue is 
displacing state law in the same way that state law is preempted (i.e. displaced) by 
“substantive” federal common law. One could object that in the Erie context it is the 
Rules of Decision Act, which provides that the “laws of the several states . . . shall 
be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in 
cases where they apply”206 that commands the application of state or federal law, not 
a doctrine of preemption. But this merely places the preemption issue inside a 
statutory wrapper. The Act provides, to paraphrase, that state laws are to apply—
they are the “rules of decision”—“in cases where they apply.” The Rules of Decision 
Act thus does not advance the analysis because it “begs the question.”207 
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The non-Hanna Erie cases (ones in which the federal law is not embodied in a 
federal rule or statute) differ from cases addressing whether substantive federal 
common law exists in two ways. First, it is usually, although not necessarily, the case 
that in the Erie context federal common law has previously been recognized; that is, 
the federal courts have created a procedural rule for their use in federal question 
cases.208 In the federal common law cases, the existence of federal common law is 
the issue. Thus, for example, in Coplay Cement Co. v. Willis & Paul Group,209 the 
court considered whether the meaning of a contract is a question of law or a question 
of fact. Federal courts had already answered the question as a matter of federal 
common law in earlier cases.210 The next question was whether to apply that federal 
common law or instead to apply state law.211 Thus, the Erie issue arose after it had 
already been decided in another context that there was federal common law. But this 
chronology need not obtain; the Court might consider simultaneously the question of 
federal common law and its applicability in a diversity case.212 
The second difference relates to the first. In “normal” federal common law 
preemption cases, federal law invalidates state law entirely for the subject matter at 
hand. The federal common law is the rule in federal court and in state court (if 
jurisdiction is concurrent). There is no question of federal common law and state law 
coexisting. This is true not only of preemption via federal common law but also in 
cases of statutory preemption. Thus, if a federal drug labeling regulation or car safety 
standard preempts state tort law, a plaintiff may not rely on state tort law in either 
state or federal court.213 But in the Erie context, the preemption is limited. State law 
does not apply in federal diversity cases, but it certainly does in state court actions. 
Thus in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc.,214 the state law that a particular 
fact question in workmen’s compensation cases was for the judge, not the jury, would 
continue to apply in state court even though federal courts would put the fact question 
to the jury under the federal common law practice. Likewise, under Gasperini v. 
Center for Humanities, Inc.,215 state appellate courts would continue to review the 
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size of jury verdicts even though federal appellate courts in diversity could not.216 
Preemption under Erie is thus a partial preemption, obviating state law in federal 
courts but not in state courts. 
That state law survives to apply in state court in these cases does not make them 
any less a species of preemption. Preemption operates in a nuanced fashion, 
superseding some laws but not other, even closely related, laws. In the context of 
express preemption, it is common for Congress to specify that some state laws are 
preempted and that others in the same field are not. In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,217 for 
example, the Court considered the express preemption provisions of the Medical 
Device Amendments.218 The Court noted that the language of the preemption 
provision indicated that “pre-emption occur only where a particular state 
requirement threatens to interfere with a specific federal interest.”219 The “statute and 
regulations . . . require a careful comparison between the allegedly pre-empting 
federal requirement and the allegedly pre-empted state requirement to determine 
whether they fall within the intended pre-emptive scope of the statute and 
regulations.”220 Thus, a state-by-state analysis of the effect of an express preemption 
clause is required.221 
In the context of conflict preemption, a state-by-state approach to preemption is 
inherent. The basic inquiry is whether compliance with both state law and federal 
law is impossible or whether state law stands as an obstacle to the purposes and 
objectives of Congress.222 Any such analysis necessarily requires one to examine 
state laws on a state-by-state basis. Some state laws will be an obstacle to Congress’ 
purposes while others are not. Thus, the question in such cases is whether federal law 
“conflicts with a particular state law.”223 For example, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 
Inc., the Court analyzed a variety of state tort claims individually and concluded that 
federal law preempted some claims but not others.224 
Preemption operates along other axes as well. We are most familiar with a 
substantive form of preemption, the rules of substantive liability under state law 
being displaced by substantive rules of federal law,225 but procedural preemption also 
occurs. The so-called “reverse Erie” problem226 involves litigation of federal causes 
of action in state court: to what extent may a state apply its procedural rules that may 
                                                                                                                 
 
 216. See id. at 437–38. 
 217. 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
 218. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2012). 
 219. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 500 (emphasis added). 
 220. Id. 
 221. See Garrick B. Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 522 (2010) 
(arguing that preemption cases raise the question whether a “particular state law at issue [is] 
in fact preempted . . . [which] asks whether Congress’ exercise of preemptive authority affects 
a specific state law”). 
 222. See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text. 
 223. Gregory M. Dickinson, Calibrating Chevron for Preemption, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 667, 
672 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 224. 505 U.S. 504, 530–31 (1992). 
 225.  See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (deciding whether compliance with 
federally required warnings precluded liability under state tort law). 
 226. See generally Clermont, supra note 165, at 44. 
2015] ERIE AND PREEMPTION 1617 
 
impede recovery under the federal cause of action? May a state, for example, dismiss 
a civil rights claim under § 1983 for failure to comply with a state notice of claim 
statute?227 Such displacement of state procedural law in state court is correctly 
viewed as a “question . . . of pre-emption.”228 
Preemption can even lead to the displacement of state procedural law in state courts 
on state causes of action. The National Bank Act at one time provided that venue for 
suits against nationally chartered banks was proper in a “court of the United States held 
within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county, 
or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located.”229 The 
Supreme Court held that the statute meant what it appeared to say: venue in state courts 
of actions against national banks is governed by federal, not state, law.230  
Preemption is also partial in another sense. When state law impermissibly 
conflicts with a federal statute, it is preempted, but, naturally, only to the extent of 
federal statute. And whatever ambiguities exist concerning the federal statute’s 
intended scope, it certainly can extend no further than the underlying source of 
constitutional authority under which Congress is legislating. For example, in finding 
preemption of state tort law due to its conflict with federal drug labelling laws in 
Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 231 the Court noted that the state law was 
“pre-empted with respect to FDA-approved drugs sold in interstate commerce.”232 
This limitation of course follows from the constitutional scheme of enumerated and 
limited federal powers. The congressional power underlying preemption may be, as 
in Bartlett, the commerce clause,233 but it need not be so. It was the constitutional 
“power to ‘establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,’” for example, that underlay 
preemption in Arizona v. United States.234 Whatever the source of federal power, 
preemption leaves untouched areas not within the grant of authority, such as 
activities not in interstate commerce. Preemption is here, again, partial, as it does not 
displace all state laws on a given subject. 
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In Erie, the grant underlying preemption is Article III, § 1 of the Constitution, 
which grants to Congress the power to “ordain and establish” the “inferior Courts.”235 
As the Court said in Hanna, “the constitutional provision for a federal court system 
(augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power 
to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts.”236 This source of 
lawmaking authority explains the limited scope of Erie preemption. State law is not 
preempted in state courts in the Erie context because the federal power in question here 
is limited to “ordain[ing] and establish[ing]” the federal courts. Just as legislation under 
the Commerce Clause can preempt only as to matters in interstate commerce, so too 
preemption by federal procedural law is limited to actions in the federal courts. 
Preemption therefore presents an array of applications. Federal law can preempt 
state substantive law, displacing the substantive rules normally applicable in state 
court. But it may preempt only some state laws and not others, depending on the 
extent and nature of the conflict between state and federal law. It can displace state 
procedural rules in actions in state courts as well when federal law supplies the 
substantive rule of decision (the reverse-Erie problem).237 It may even displace state 
procedural law when state law supplies the substantive rule of decision (the National 
Bank Act).238 In the last context, it should be noted that the procedure Congress 
demands of a state court will sometimes differ from that laid out for a federal court. 
In actions against a national bank in receivership, the current venue statute places 
federal venue in the district where the bank’s “principal place of business is located.”239 
The provision for state venue, while also using the principle place of business as the 
test for venue, specifies a county.240 Thus, if the bank is headquartered in a county that 
does not contain the federal district court for that district, actions will be in different 
venues (counties) depending upon whether the case is in federal court or state court. 
Congress could have specified an identical venue rule for federal and state courts by 
placing state court venue in the county in which the action would have been brought 
had suit been in federal court. Instead, Congress has displaced (preempted) state 
procedural law with a federal procedural law not applicable in federal court. 
Adding to this list the preemption of state law in actions in a federal court by force 
of federal procedural common law—that is, the non-Hanna Erie context—requires 
no great leap. Federal common law has the power to preempt just as federal statutory 
law does.241 A “few areas involving ‘uniquely federal interests,’ . . . are so committed 
by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is 
pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed 
(absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts—so-called ‘federal common 
law.’”242 In the Erie context, this preemption is limited to preemption of state law in 
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federal court actions; it does not displace state law in state court actions. But this 
follows perfectly from the nature of the underlying federal lawmaking power and 
from the requirement of preemption that the matter involve “uniquely federal 
interests.”243 There is rarely a unique federal interest in the procedure applied in state 
courts in actions governed by state substantive law. The scope of the preemption in 
such cases is necessarily limited to actions in federal court. 
Finally, one case—Semtek International, Inc., v. Lockheed Martin Corp.244—
draws many of these strands together, nicely illustrates that Erie cases are preemption 
cases whether or not a federal rule is involved, and demonstrates that the same factors 
are at play on either side of the supposed dichotomy of Hanna. In Semtek, the Court 
addressed the “question whether the claim-preclusive effect of a federal judgment 
dismissing a diversity action on statute-of-limitations grounds is determined by the 
law of the State in which the federal court sits.”245 The Court rejected an argument 
that the matter was governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), which 
provides that certain dismissals (including the type of dismissal involved in the case) 
were “an adjudication upon the merits” unless the district court “otherwise 
specifies.”246 The Court read Rule 41 more narrowly than the parties advocated for 
because of concerns that Rule 41, if read literally, might violate the Rules Enabling 
Act247 and “the federalism principle of Erie . . . by engendering ‘substantial’ 
variations [in outcomes] between state and federal litigation which would 
‘[l]ikely . . . influence the choice of a forum.’”248 Having concluded that no federal 
rule or other written law governed the matter (“no other federal textual provision, 
neither of the Constitution nor of any statute, addresses the claim-preclusive effect 
of a judgment in a federal diversity action”249), the Court held the matter to be 
governed by “federal common law.”250 Significantly, once the Court had shifted the 
analysis from Rule 41 and the Hanna side of the analysis to federal common law and 
away from Hanna, it again utilized the same Erie policies to determine the content 
of the federal common law. Federal common law would in this case consist of 
borrowed state law, since deviating from the content of state law would produce 
results “that Erie seeks to avoid.”251 The Court left open, however, the possibility 
that in some cases the content of federal common law would deviate from state law: 
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“This federal reference to state law will not obtain, of course, in situations in which 
the state law is incompatible with federal interests.”252 
Semtek is thus a buffet table of preemption and Erie. It first considers a federal 
rule as potentially governing, but reads it narrowly in order to uphold Erie policies.253 
Then, there being no federal rule to apply, the Court proceeds to declare the content 
of federal common law.254 And in deciding that question, the Court found the same 
Erie policies relevant and also invoked “federal interests” as limitation on state 
law.255 In short, the same analysis applied no matter which side of the supposed 
Hanna dichotomy the case fell on and that analysis was a preemption analysis. 
C. How Erie Analysis Is Improved by Considering It as a Preemption Doctrine 
Because the Erie doctrine, in any of its forms, is a doctrine of preemption, one 
should be able to import, or at least analogize from, doctrines and factors that appear 
in other preemption cases. In fact, one sees traces of certain preemption doctrines in 
some of the Erie cases. In particular, the non-Hanna Erie cases, those in which 
unwritten federal law (federal common law) displaces state law, reveal a significant 
commonality to standard preemption doctrines. Cases under the other (Hanna) 
branch of Erie, those considering displacement of state law by a federal rule or by a 
federal statute, show less overt similarities to the preemption cases. But it is my 
contention that preemption doctrines better explain the results in these cases. 
There are five areas of inquiry in common between standard preemption and the 
Erie cases: the importance of federal interests, the importance of the nature of state 
law, an analysis of whether one may comply with both state and federal law or 
whether the two cannot coexist, the need to consider explicit statutory or regulatory 
directives as to preemption, and the need to balance the competing values of legal 
uniformity and legal diversity. 
1. Federal Interests 
The Supreme Court has provided two versions of the proper approach to take in 
cases in which state law conflicts with unwritten federal law: the holding of Byrd256 
and the dicta from Hanna.257 Both ask about the effect on the outcome of following 
federal rather than state law. But Byrd adds a factor not present in Hanna’s dicta: 
balanced against the concern of different outcomes and forum-shopping is the 
validation of “countervailing considerations”258 of “federal policy.”259 Making use 
of the Byrd analysis and offsetting other Erie concerns with a concern for federal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 252. Id. 
 253. See id. at 503–04. 
 254. See id. at 508. 
 255. Id. at 509. 
 256. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958); see also 
supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text. 
 257. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–468 (1965); see also supra notes 41–46 and 
accompanying text. 
 258. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537. 
 259. Id. at 538. 
2015] ERIE AND PREEMPTION 1621 
 
interests does much to explain the Erie cases. Moreover, this mode of analysis—
measuring the applicability of state law as against competing federal law in light of 
federal interests—is entirely consistent with the preemption doctrine. 
The preemption cases are also concerned with the existence and weight of federal 
interests. A predicate for preemption of a whole field by federal law is the existence 
of a “federal interest [that] is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to 
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”260 Similarly, in the context 
of conflict preemption, when it is argued that state law is preempted because it 
“conflicts with Congress’ purposes and objectives,” the inquiry into federal 
“purposes and objectives” necessarily requires an examination of the “nature of the 
federal interest.”261 In other words, “[w]hat is a sufficient obstacle [to find 
preemption] is . . . informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and 
identifying its purpose and intended effects.”262 
Now, preemption plays out differently in the Erie context, as the question there is 
not a field preemption in which one displaces the entirety of state law in the area of 
the field of regulation. The scale of preemption in Erie is smaller. But because 
preemption in Erie is accomplishing less, the magnitude of the federal interest need not 
be as great to call for the displacement of state law by federal law. The context of Erie 
also leads to another difference: the federal interests are of a procedural nature, not, as 
in standard preemption, substantive. Yet despite these differences, both preemption and 
this branch of Erie are concerned with preserving federal interests. 
The role of federal interests in Erie is nicely illustrated by Stewart Organization, 
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.263 Stewart held that 28 U.S.C. § 1404,264 the federal statute that 
addresses transfers between federal courts, was applicable and controlled under 
Hanna as against a state law that was hostile to forum-selection clauses.265 That 
§ 1404 speaks to the question of forum-selection clauses is far from obvious, as its 
text says nothing about them.266 But there is a good reason to read federal law 
expansively here so as to preempt state law. The case was to be tried in some federal 
court in any event (subject-matter jurisdiction was undoubted and not in issue) and 
the only question was whether the case was to be tried in a federal court in New York 
or a federal district court in Alabama.267 Allocating the business of the federal courts 
among different districts—that is, determining proper venue—implicates important 
federal interests. It is an issue of the internal operations of the federal judicial system 
and thus properly under the control of federal, not state, law. The presence of strong 
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federal interests similarly explains Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods.268 
There the Court read Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, which addresses 
sanctions on frivolous appeals, expansively, finding it to conflict with and thus 
preempt a state law awarding a penalty on all losing appeals.269 One could have read 
federal law in a way that allowed it to coexist with state law, but the Court declined 
to do so. Burlington can be understood as giving a relatively expansive reading to 
federal law in order to vindicate federal interests. Imposing costs on an appeal makes 
it more expensive. There is a federal interest in determining when and in what amount 
to tax an appeal. After all, the higher the cost of appeals, the fewer there will be. If a 
rule of sanctioning losing appeals prevailed, there would be fewer appeals. The 
federal system would then be forced to take additional steps to assure that cases are 
correctly resolved in the district courts since intervention by the appellate courts to 
correct errors would be less frequent. This would then require a redeployment of 
resources toward the district courts. All of this—the disincentives to appeal, the 
frequency of appeals, and the allocation of resources to trial courts—are matters of 
federal concern when the courts in question are federal courts. 
Of course, Stewart and Burlington are on the Hanna side of the Erie analysis. 
They involve conflicts between federal statutory law and state law. The injunction in 
Byrd to consider federal interests was in a case on the non-Hanna side of Erie, 
dealing with unwritten federal law. But the Court has now made clear that, despite 
Hanna, written federal law does not woodenly apply under Erie. Courts are to 
“interpret[] the Federal Rules . . . with sensitivity to important state interests and 
regulatory policies.”270 And one cannot assess the importance of state policies without 
considering the other half of the equation, the federal interests behind federal law. 
“[I]mmoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules” should be avoided if they “would 
trench on state prerogatives without serving any countervailing federal interest.”271 
The approach I argue for leads to a recoupling of the Hanna and non-Hanna 
branches of Erie. On either side of the analysis, one must consult some ordering 
principles to aid in the interpretation of the scope of federal law. Once it is admitted 
that federal rules or statutes have to be interpreted in an Erie case, one must 
necessarily provide a basis for interpretation. What are the factors that will lead a 
court to read written federal law broadly such that it conflicts with state law or 
narrowly such that the two can coexist? Not surprisingly, given the preemption 
context of Erie, one such factor is the existence and strength of any federal interest. 
This should be obvious, but the Hanna cases do not expressly refer to an examination 
of federal interests and in fact at one point expressly disavowed engaging in any 
process of interpretation.272 But if one understands Erie as a preemption doctrine, 
then examining federal interests is unavoidable. 
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2. The Nature of the State Law 
The foregoing shows how federal interests are regarded in an Erie analysis. The 
Byrd test also asks about the nature of the state law—whether it is “bound up with” 
“state-created rights and obligations” or is merely a rule of “form and mode.”273 If 
state law is of the former type, it is to apply in diversity cases.274 This concern about 
the nature of state law is also present in preemption analysis. The Court has attempted 
to preserve from preemption areas that are “traditionally occupied by the States.”275 
Thus “courts should assume that ‘the historic police powers of the States’ are not 
superseded ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”276 There is, 
for example, “‘a presumption against preemption’ of state laws governing domestic 
relations.”277 This is a strong presumption, but can be overridden when the state’s 
family law does “‘major damage’ to ‘clear and substantial’ federal interests.”278 This 
presumption in favor of state law in areas of traditional state regulation stems from 
“respect for the States as ‘independent sovereigns in our federal system.’”279 
These principles are familiar to a student of the Erie doctrine. Respect for states 
as autonomous actors in the federal system lies at the heart of the Erie doctrine. 
“[T]he Constitution of the United States,” said the Court in Erie, “recognizes and 
preserves the autonomy and independence of the States.”280 The Erie doctrine is 
driven by the principle that “our constitutional system leaves to state regulation” 
certain “primary decisions respecting human conduct.”281 The results of the Erie 
cases reflect this. In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,282 the issue was the 
applicability in a diversity case of a state law providing for “closer surveillance” of 
the size of jury awards than was given under federal practice.283 The Court held that 
state law controlled.284 The Court applied the analysis from the Hanna dicta rather 
than its holding, implicitly characterizing the Erie issue as involving a dispute 
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between state law and unwritten federal law.285 But why wasn’t, as Justice Scalia 
argued, the matter governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, which explicitly 
identified the “reasons” for which new trials could be granted?286 Consistent with the 
common roots of Erie and preemption, this constrained reading of a federal rule can 
be explained as a desire to be “attentive to a State’s regulatory policy.”287 The state 
law in Gasperini was a “tort reform measure[]”288 designed “to curtail medical and 
dental malpractice, and to contain ‘already high malpractice premiums.’”289 Such a 
law, one recalibrating the scope of tort liability, lies in an area, in the words of the 
preemption cases, “traditionally occupied by the States.”290 This explains the Court’s 
narrow reading of Rule 59. 
And so in general, whether the Erie issue involves either written or unwritten 
federal law, one should look at the nature of the competing state law. If the Erie issue 
is one of a conflict between state law and unwritten federal law, Byrd commands this 
inquiry directly. If the federal law exists in the form of a federal rule or statute, the 
nature of the state law it allegedly conflicts with is relevant to the application of a 
canon of construction: federal law is not to be read “cavalierly” to preempt areas 
traditionally the domain of the states.291 
3. The Dual Compliance Problem: Does State Law Supplement Federal Law 
or Conflict with It? 
As noted above,292 how to assess whether state law conflicts with a federal rule or 
statute or instead can coexist with it as a supplemental requirement recurs as an 
unanswered puzzle in the Erie cases. The Supreme Court has variously phrased the 
nature of the conflict it is looking for: are state and federal law in “direct 
collision?”293 Is the “clash . . . unavoidable?”294 It has said that a federal rule is to be 
applied if it is “sufficiently broad to control the issue.”295 
A similar problem exists in the preemption cases. One branch of the doctrine 
holds that state law is preempted when it “conflicts” with federal law. Impossibility 
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of compliance with both federal and state law is thus one way to find conflict 
preemption.296 If, on the other hand, dual compliance is possible, preemption also 
exists when state law stands as an “obstacle to the . . . full purposes and objectives 
of Congress.”297 The former branch of conflict preemption—impossibility—is “a 
demanding defense.”298 It is a “rare creature,”299 “vanishingly narrow,”300 requiring 
that “compliance with both federal and state [law be] a physical impossibility.”301 
Because this type of preemption is so rarely found,302 the majority of conflict 
preemption cases are funneled into the other branch, “obstacle” preemption. While 
impossibility, if found, categorically results in a finding of preemption,303 obstacle 
preemption is more nuanced.304 Conflict preemption, then, is dominated by factors 
rather than categorical rules. 
The same is, or should be, true of Erie. It is a pretense to suggest that cases 
involving a federal rule or statute are easily decided under a categorical rule that 
depends on no further analysis of the nature of the competing state law or the nature 
of a federal interest. It is a mistake for the Court to say that it need not “wade into 
Erie’s murky waters” if a federal rule “answers the question in dispute” because 
“it governs.”305 Just as in preemption cases, the presence of a rule or statute does 
not end the inquiry, it instead begins it. One must interpret the statute or rule to 
determine whether it was intended to displace state law. And in the Erie context, 
as in preemption, that interpretation is aided by a presumption of not displacing 
state law in areas of traditional state regulation306 and an examination of the 
purposes of the federal law.307 Thus, looking for an “impossibility” of complying 
with state and federal law will decide few cases under Erie. 
The Erie cases in which it is unclear if state law should be read as conflicting 
with federal law or merely supplementing it support this conclusion. For example, 
is a requirement that a plaintiff post a bond in a derivative action in “conflict” with 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, which sets out the requirements for 
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derivative actions but does not require (or forbid) a bond? In Cohen v. Beneficial 
Industrial Loan Corp.,308 the Court held that the federal rule did not “conflict with 
the statute in question.”309 The Court did not take the silence in the rules on the 
matter of a bond as a prohibition of one. State law could permissibly impose 
supplemental burdens on the plaintiff.310 This treatment is consistent with the 
preemption cases on “impossibility.” That narrow preemption doctrine is limited 
to state and federal laws that “impose directly conflicting duties . . . as they would, 
for example, if the federal law said, ‘you must [do X],’ while the state law said, 
‘you may not.’”311 If it is possible to comply with both, then there is no 
“impossibility” preemption. “[E]ven if one sovereign’s law purports to give people 
a right to engage in conduct that the other sovereign’s law purports to prohibit,” 
dual compliance is not truly impossible because “a person could comply with both 
state and federal law simply by refraining from the conduct.”312 In the Erie context, 
when under federal law a litigant is given a right to proceed without being 
burdened by a particular procedural requirement (such as a bond) but state law 
would impose that burden, compliance with both federal and state law is possible. 
Cohen supports this approach in finding no conflict between federal and state 
law; rather than using the blunt instrument of impossibility, it instead looked at 
the nature of state law, found it to substantively create a new liability, and held 
it applicable for that reason.313 
Of course one could bend Hanna to fit the same template. Hanna involved 
whether service could be left at the defendant’s residence. Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4 allowed this but state law forbade it.314 One sovereign allowed 
something (leaving service at a residence) that the other forbade. One could comply 
with both laws by forgoing leaving process at the defendant’s residence; such service 
under Rule 4 was not required, only permitted.315 Nonetheless, the Court 
characterized state and federal law as having a “clash [that] is unavoidable”316 and 
applied federal law under the Supremacy Clause. Although the result is certainly 
correct, the better explanation is that given the nature of the state law (it was not a 
law designed to impact “primary decisions respecting human conduct”317) and the 
federal interests in providing a means of service in its own court proceedings that 
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accommodates concerns of cost and efficacy of actual notice, no reason existed to 
not find state law preempted by Rule 4. 
Searching in Erie cases for conflicts between state and federal law that rise to 
an “impossibility” of dual compliance is a fool’s errand, an exercise in futility. 
Few of the federal rules are compulsory.318 One could imagine, I suppose, a state 
law forbidding the joinder of a particular counterclaim that federal law would 
consider a compulsory counterclaim. But setting aside such outliers, the federal 
rules much more often enable rather than require. The implication, then, is that 
one must have some other basis beyond “impossibility” to decide the cases. And 
those Erie cases that discuss the nature of state law and the existence of federal 




4. Express Preemption and Agency Preemption: The Role of the Enabling Act 
and the Supreme Court as an Agency 
I have left to one side express preemption,319 which is perhaps the core preemption 
doctrine. Since preemption is a matter of congressional intent, there is no better 
source for determining preemption than an explicit statement by Congress of its 
intent—an express preemption provision.  
In the Erie context, express preemption could focus on the Rules Enabling Act, 
which provides—after granting the Supreme Court the power to create rules of 
practice, procedure, and evidence—that “[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall 
be of no further force or effect.”320 The problem with the Enabling Act as an express 
guide to preemption is its breadth. It would purport under its broadest reading to 
eliminate all laws that conflict in any way with a federal rule. This would change the 
result, it would seem, in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,321 Walker 
v. Armco Steel Corp.,322 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,323 and Gasperini 
v. Center for Humanities, Inc.324 In each of these cases, one could have characterized 
a federal rule as conflicting with state law.325 That the Supreme Court did not so 
conclude means that the Enabling Act is not to be given its broadest possible 
interpretation. But then what interpretation is to be given to it? We are left to once 
again chase the wild boar of congressional intent, a wily creature, difficult to track 
and harder still to bring to ground. 
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This again mirrors what one finds in preemption case law outside the Erie context. 
Express preemption clauses are useful but still must be construed. If a federal statute 
“contains an express pre-emption clause, it does not immediately end the inquiry 
because the question of the substance and scope of Congress’ displacement of state 
law still remains.”326 And in the context of express preemption, as in other areas of 
preemption, there exists a presumption against preemption in areas traditionally left 
to state law.327 The Court assumes that “Congress would not defeat the operation of 
traditional, historic police powers of the states without quite explicitly saying so.”328 
Thus, even when one encounters an express preemption provision, bright-line rules are 
not to be found. Courts use a “variety of interpretive tools . . . to determine 
congressional intent, including an evaluation of the ordinary meaning of the terms of 
the statute, its structure, and its purpose as discerned through the legislative history.”329 
And such is, and should be, the analysis under the Rules Enabling Act.330 The 
Enabling Act’s provision that states “[a]ll laws in conflict with [the federal] rules 
shall be of no further force or effect”331 does not end the preemption analysis. Instead 
it heralds its initiation. Whether a state law is “in conflict” with a federal rule depends 
upon an interpretation of the scope of the state law and the scope of the allegedly 
conflicting federal rule. As the Court said in Hanna, sometimes a litigant relies on a 
federal rule as against state law but the federal rule is found to be “not as broad”332 
as was argued. In such cases, state law does not “conflict” under the Rules Enabling 
Act and is not preempted. But this interpretive effort, as I have attempted to 
demonstrate above, rests upon an analysis of the nature of the state law (is it within 
a traditional state domain?) and competing federal interests.333 
There is another route available that would allow the Court to make use of express 
preemption in Erie cases. Under standard preemption doctrine, “an agency regulation 
with the force of law can pre-empt conflicting state requirements.”334 Whether there 
is preemption depends, of course, upon normal preemption analysis. The Court must 
determine whether Congress intended to occupy the field, whether dual compliance 
with state and federal law is impossible, and whether state law stands as an obstacle 
to the purposes and objectives of federal law.335 On this last point, the Court gives an 
agency’s explanation of a conflict between its regulation and state law some degree 
of deference: 
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In prior cases, we have given “some weight” to an agency’s views about 
the impact of tort law on federal objectives when “the subject matter is 
technica[l] and the relevant history and background are complex and 
extensive.” Even in such cases, however, we have not deferred to an 
agency’s conclusion that state law is pre-empted. Rather, we have 
attended to an agency’s explanation of how state law affects the 
regulatory scheme. While agencies have no special authority to 
pronounce on pre-emption absent delegation by Congress, they do have 
a unique understanding of the statutes they administer and an attendant 
ability to make informed determinations about how state requirements 
may pose an “obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.” The weight we accord the 
agency’s explanation of state law’s impact on the federal scheme 
depends on its thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness.336 
The process by which the Supreme Court assesses the preemption of state law by 
a federal rule is oddly back-loaded. Federal agencies, operating under their delegated 
authority from Congress, make rules and sometimes declare their understanding of 
the impact of their rules on state law.337 The Supreme Court similarly acts under a 
delegation from Congress, the Enabling Act, to create rules.338 It does not, however, 
at the time of adoption of a rule or amendment make statements concerning the 
applicability of the rule as against state law—it does not, that is, address preemption 
(i.e., Erie) questions. Instead, it transmits the rules to Congress and then later rules 
on the question of whether the rule preempts state law. To be sure, that the Court did 
transmit the rules to Congress indicates that it has at least provisionally determined 
that the rules are valid, that is, within the power granted under the Enabling Act. As 
the Court has said, “the study and approval given each proposed Rule by the 
Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference, and this Court . . . give the Rules 
presumptive validity under both the constitutional and statutory constraints.”339 But 
whether a state law conflicts with the federal rule and whether the rule will displace 
state law, in contrast, are not considered.340 
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One might wonder at this. On its face this process seems both inefficient and 
disingenuous. It would obviously lower litigation costs if the applicability of a 
federal rule as against state law were known before, not after, litigation under the 
rule took place. The rule was before the Court once, at the time of adoption. Why not 
simply address Erie issues—both validity of the rule under the Enabling Act and the 
rule’s displacement of state law—when the Court first has the rule before it? The 
Court would then stand in the same position as an agency that has promulgated a rule 
and made a statement as to its displacement of state law. If agencies are granted this 
prerogative and their statements deserve deference, why should the Court treat itself 
worse? Agency determinations warrant deference when the agency has “a unique 
understanding of the statutes they administer and an attendant ability to make 
informed determinations about how state requirements may pose an ‘obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”341 
If the Court does not have such a “unique understanding,” then we are all in trouble. 
I can imagine three explanations for the Court’s failure to take this route and 
front-load the Erie analysis. One is somewhat embarrassing—having a little of the 
feeling of the emperor and his lack of clothes. It may be that the Court feels itself 
inadequate—in terms of time and resources—to assess the question of 
displacement of state law and give the Erie issue considered thought at the time of 
transmission to Congress. The Court is a busy institution. The Advisory Committee 
devotes many hours to proposed rules and amendments. The Court may decline to 
address the Erie issue at the time of adoption, in other words, because it has little 
useful to say at that point. 
Several Justices on occasion have expressed a similar sentiment. Justice White 
noted, in commenting on the transmission of proposed rule amendments, that “the 
Justices have hardly ever refused to transmit the rules submitted by the Judicial 
Conference.”342 From this fact he inferred that “a sizable majority of the 21 Justices 
who sat during this period concluded that Congress intended them to have a rather 
limited role in the rulemaking process.”343 He believed, therefore, that “the Court’s 
role . . . is to transmit the Judicial Conference’s recommendations without change 
and without careful study, as long as there is no suggestion that the committee system 
has not operated with integrity.”344 Similarly, Justices Black and Douglas argued for 
removing the Court from the rule-making process entirely, making the path from the 
Rules Advisory Committee to Congress unmediated. They advocated this because of 
the greater investment of the Advisory Committee: “It is they . . . who do the work, 
not we, and the rules have only our imprimatur. The only contribution that we 
actually make is an occasional exercise of a veto power.”345 They also argued that 
such a change would “relieve [the Court] of the embarrassment of having to sit in 
judgment on the constitutionality of rules which [it has] approved and which as 
applied in given situations might have to be declared invalid.”346 
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But other considerations also might argue for the Court postponing the Erie issue 
until after transmission of the rules. Addressing the Erie question in the absence of 
an adversarial proceeding stretches the Court’s institutional competence. The Court, 
of course, is not limited to acting solely in a judicial capacity: it makes rules for its 
own procedure.347 The Chief Justice presides over the judicial conference.348 And 
under the Enabling Act, it has a role in the creation of the rules for the lower courts.349 
Such activities do not run afoul of strictures against advisory opinions.350 But they 
do take the Court to a ground where its footing is less certain. The Court has authority 
to make internal rules,351 but in so acting it takes on the appearance of a 
“quasi-legislature,”352 a role for which the Court lacks the basic institutional 
equipment. In short, the Court acts best when it acts as a court—a decider of disputes 
in litigation—and not as a rule maker. Moreover, if an Erie issue were to arise in 
litigation before the Court when it had previously addressed the Erie issue as a rule 
maker, the Court would have to entertain the possibility of overturning its prior 
conclusions on the rule. Wearing its judicial hat (or robe), it would reverse itself for an 
action done while wearing its agency hat. If this is unpalatable, the alternative may be 
worse. If it does not entertain the Erie issue, then a litigant is foreclosed from any 
judicial review in an adversarial proceeding concerning the applicability of an agency 
rule. As Justices Black and Douglas said, this would indeed be an “embarrassment.”353 
Finally, and somewhat related to the previous point, an Erie analysis does not 
consider a federal rule in isolation to determine its applicability in a diversity case. 
The Court must examine federal law as against a particular competing state law. 
Erie has this in common with preemption in general, which asks a particular 
question about a particular state’s law: does it conflict with federal purposes and 
objectives?354 It would therefore be difficult, if not impossible, for the Court to 
transmit a rule or an amendment with a proviso that it does or does not displace 
state law. Such a statement is too broad. Under Erie, one must consider whether 
the state law interferes with a federal interest and whether the state law is in an 
area traditionally regulated by the states.355 Different state laws will have different 
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degrees of interference with federal interests and will attempt to regulate different 
areas. So, a generic Erie answer is unavailable. 
That being said, it would be useful if the Court (or the Advisory Committee) 
would at least preview the Erie question. It might, at a minimum, remove some Erie 
issues by declaring that certain rules are not to apply in diversity cases. Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 3 provides a simple illustration: it states that a “civil action is 
commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”356 This could mean that an action 
is timely under a statute of limitations if it is filed before the expiration of the statute 
even if the defendant is served afterwards. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.357 held, 
however, that Rule 3 was inapplicable—there was “no indication that the Rule was 
intended to” apply358—to the statute of limitations issue in diversity cases. But it left 
untouched a line of cases that held that Rule 3 meant precisely that if the cause of 
action arose under federal law.359 The upshot is that Rule 3 defines what must be 
done to beat the statute of limitations in federal question but not diversity cases. Why 
couldn’t the Court have said that Rule 3 applies only to actions arising under federal 
law in the first place, when Rule 3 was initially promulgated? In fact, some rules do 
explicitly limit their application in diversity cases. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
15 addresses the question whether an amendment to a pleading relates back to the 
date of the original pleading so as to satisfy statute of limitations concerns.360 It sets 
out a standard for determining this question, but supplies as an alternative to the federal 
rule of relation back in reference to state law: relation back is allowed if “the law that 
provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back.”361 This is clearly a 
reference to state law, as it is state law that provides the statute of limitations in diversity 
cases.362 Rule 15 thus has within it preemption guidance: it is not intended to provide 
the exclusive means of relation back in diversity cases; state law is intended to remain 
applicable as an alternative. So, even if the Court cannot answer all Erie issues in 
advance, there appears to be no reason why the Court could not at least avoid some of 
them by disavowing in the rule an intent to displace state law. 
5. Preemption, Erie, and Uniformity 
The concern of uniformity figures in both an Erie analysis and a preemption 
analysis. The kind of uniformity valued in preemption (national uniformity) is, 
however, quite different from the kind of uniformity most often mentioned in the 
Erie cases (uniformity within a state, i.e., between a federal court and a state court 
within a state). On the other hand, within the Erie cases lies a second uniformity 
value. When one takes that second Erie uniformity value into account, one again sees 
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similarities between Erie and preemption. And when the pieces are fully put together, 
the two puzzles prove to have an identical solution. 
In preemption analysis, the need for a nationally uniform body of law is a factor 
in favor of preemption. When Congress has extensively regulated an area and it is 
“one requiring national uniformity of regulation,” field preemption occurs.363 
Likewise, the “perceived need for uniformity of standards is, and has always been, a 
critical factor” in assessing obstacle preemption.364 Preemption will occur in order to 
prevent states from interfering with legislation that Congress intended to be a 
“harmonious whole.”365 While this always remains a matter of Congress’ intent, that 
an area is ripe for national uniformity supports a conclusion that this is what Congress 
intended. Thus, a perceived need for national uniformity of regulation supports 
finding preemption. 
The policy of uniformity in the Erie context usually means something else. In Erie 
itself, the Court delineated two different kinds of uniformity. Swift v. Tyson366 had 
“attempt[ed] to promote uniformity of law throughout the United States,” but 
ironically “the doctrine . . . prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of 
the State.”367 In other words, Swift valued national or interstate uniformity; Erie 
rejected that in favor of intrastate uniformity.368 Thus, as the Court put it in York, a 
federal diversity court is “in effect, only another court of the State.”369 Thus the 
federal court must achieve uniformity not nationally but with a state court in the state 
in which it sits:370 “the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be 
substantially the same . . . as it would be if tried in a State court.”371 It would thus 
appear that Erie’s notion of uniformity is at odds with that of standard preemption. 
But there are in Erie competing uniformity values. The uniformity policy in Erie 
discussed above is a factor that calls for the application of state law. The other type 
of uniformity policy in Erie, less frequently mentioned, pulls in the opposite 
direction, in favor of applying a federal rule. The “provision of uniform and 
consistent procedure in federal courts” is “the fundamental purpose of the Federal 
Rules.”372 This goal of “bring[ing] about uniformity in the federal courts by getting 
away from local rules” was “‘[o]ne of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules.’”373 
                                                                                                                 
 
 363. See Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. 
REV. 967, 970 (2002). 
 364. Id. at 1016; see also Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: 
Preemption and Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 293, 348 (1993). 
 365. See Arizona v. U.S., 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 72 (1941)). 
 366. 41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 367. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75 (1938). 
 368. See id. (“In attempting to promote uniformity of law throughout the United States, the 
doctrine had prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the State.”). 
 369. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945). 
 370. This point was made clear in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 
(1941) (holding that “[t]he conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware 
must conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts”). 
 371. York, 326 U.S. at 109. 
 372. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 24 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 373. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (quoting Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. 
Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963)). 
1634 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:1591 
 
This uniformity policy cuts against state-by-state variation in the federal courts. It is 
in fact a policy of national procedural uniformity. There are, in short, two Erie 
uniformity policies. The task is to accommodate the concern for national procedural 
uniformity with the concern for state autonomy in governing primary legal relations. 
Erie thus attempts to balance uniformity and diversity. 
Seen in this light, Erie and preemption treat uniformity similarly. Both pay heed 
to a policy of national uniformity. This concern of uniformity pulls the analysis 
toward applying federal law. But in both areas, there is counterweight. In Erie it is a 
concern for the “the autonomy and independence of the States.”374 In preemption, it 
is a preservation of “the historic police powers of the States.”375 When preemption is 
not found in a substantive area, this has the effect, as does applying state law in Erie, 
of preserving the diversity of the states. The “presumption against preemption 
promotes federalism: states will be more free to be laboratories of democracy, 
allowing them to compete against the federal government and each other in the quest 
for efficient regulatory policies.”376 Finding preemption, on the other hand, “force[s] 
national uniformity on a particular issue, stifling state-by-state diversity and 
experimentation.”377 In short, in both areas there is a careful balancing of uniformity 
and diversity. 
6. The Analysis Applied to Shady Grove 
To illustrate how the principles of preemption apply to an Erie case, I will 
examine the Supreme Court’s latest Erie case, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates 
v. Allstate Insurance Co.,378 through this analytic lens. 
At issue was the applicability in a diversity case of a New York statute providing 
that “an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or 
imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.”379 The claim in Shady 
Grove was for statutory interest on late-paid insurance benefits,380 which would seem 
to qualify for class treatment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The Court 
fractured rather badly. Justice Scalia wrote an opinion, part of which commanded 
five votes.381 It held that Rule 23 controlled the question of class action treatment.382 
It concluded that Rule 23 was a “categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets 
the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action.”383 Justice Scalia then 
concluded that Rule 23 was valid under the Rules Enabling Act,384 using the test of 
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Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., which asks whether the rule “really regulates procedure.”385 
Since Rule 23 did, Justice Scalia found it valid.386 And since it was valid, it controlled 
under Hanna and the Supremacy Clause.387 But this part of his opinion (on validity) 
drew only four votes; Justice Stevens departed from Justice Scalia to write a separate 
and different analysis of Rule 23’s validity.388 He believed Rule 23 was valid not 
simply because it really regulated procedure, but because New York law was not 
substantive and therefore Rule 23 did not “abridge, enlarge, or modify” state 
substantive rights.389 Finally, Justice Ginsburg, with Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and 
Alito dissented. They would not have found Rule 23 to violate the Enabling Act. 
Instead they would simply find it inapplicable. Justice Ginsburg characterized the 
line of Erie cases as “vigilantly read[ing] the Federal Rules to avoid conflict with 
state laws.”390 She chided the majority for departing from the prior approach of 
“avoid[ing] immoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules that would trench on 
state prerogatives without serving any countervailing federal interest”391 and 
employing instead “a mechanical reading of Federal Rules, insensitive to state 
interests.”392 In the view of the dissent, Rule 23 conflicted with a state policy that 
had “a manifestly substantive end: Limiting a defendant’s liability in a single lawsuit 
in order to prevent the exorbitant inflation of penalties.”393 
The opinions may be divided into three approaches. Justice Scalia applies 
preemption under the Enabling Act remorselessly. If a federal rule, at least in part, 
touches on a procedural matter, it is valid and trumps contrary state law, regardless 
of the nature or purpose of state law: “it is not the substantive or procedural nature 
or purpose of the affected state law that matters, but the substantive or procedural 
nature of the Federal Rule.”394 Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, on the other hand, both 
think that solicitude for state law and the underlying state substantive policies that 
compete with the federal rule should influence the analysis. Where they differ is in 
the placement of this concern. Justice Stevens would seek to protect state 
prerogatives in a validity analysis: if the rule does “abridge, enlarge or modify” state 
substantive law it is invalid.395 Justice Ginsburg places the protection of state 
substantive policies within the interpretative phase: if there are significant state 
substantive policies, the rule should be read to avoid a conflict.396 
Justice Ginsburg has the best of it here. Considering Shady Grove as a preemption 
case, one would start with a presumption against preemption. State law could more 
than plausibly be read as an effort to limit liability in cases of statutory penalties. The 
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effort was “to avoid ‘annihilating punishment’” in the form of a class action to 
recover a penalty under state law.397 Setting the amount of a statutory penalty is in 
any sense of the word substantive. Since this is in an area of traditional state 
regulation, the presumption should exist in full force. This rules out Justice Scalia’s 
rigid approach, which ignores state policies.398 
And Justice Ginsburg is to be preferred over Justice Stevens. Her approach allows 
moderation. Under Justice Stevens’s approach, there is no mechanism to protect state 
policies other than the draconian one of holding the federal rule invalid, a step he 
himself regards as extreme: “the bar for finding an Enabling Act problem is a high 
one.”399 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg’s approach more accurately captures the 
preemption issue: Is federal law to displace state law? Justice Stevens’s approach, on 
the other hand, replaces the question of accommodating federal and state law with 
one of invalidating federal law. If applied in a standard preemption case, his approach 
would seemingly find all state laws preempted unless the conflicting federal law was 
invalid. Federal law applies, according to Justice Stevens, unless it is invalid. This, 
if applied to standard preemption cases, would greatly expand the scope of federal 
law and change the result of many cases. Federal law would control so long as 
Congress did not exceed its legislative competence under, for example, the 
Commerce Clause. Such a result simply fails to describe the actual results of the 
preemption cases. 
One final note on Shady Grove. Justice Scalia would have Erie questions under a 
federal rule answered uniformly throughout the nation. He concluded that Rule 23 is 
“valid in all jurisdictions.”400 In his understanding, a rule “is not valid in some 
jurisdictions and invalid in others—or valid in some cases and invalid in others—
depending upon whether its effect is to frustrate a state substantive law.”401 This 
approach is also implicit in Justice Stevens’s approach. If he had found New York’s 
policy to be substantive, he would have invalidated Rule 23. But that would 
necessarily have a national application. Rule 23 would be invalid and inapplicable 
even in states that, unlike New York, had a procedural, not a substantive, policy in 
conflict with the rule or even had no conflicting policy whatsoever. Justice 
Ginsburg’s approach, on the other hand, is consistent with a preemption approach. 
The question is whether a particular state law is in conflict with federal law. This 
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necessitates—properly so—a state-by-state approach. And that is the pattern on 
preemption cases.402 
CONCLUSION 
In Hanna v. Plumer,403 the Supreme Court attempted to divide Erie issues into 
two categories, one straightforward (when a federal rule was involved) and the other 
more nuanced (when the conflicting federal law was judge-made). This division, I 
believe, cannot stand. In either type of case, one is examining a preemption problem, 
and preemption problems are anything but a straightforward and simple reading of 
the relevant federal statute or regulation. The question of interpretation, of scope, is 
always present. Applying the principles of interpretation used in the preemption 
cases—such as the presumption against preemption in areas traditionally left to the 
states and the assessment of a federal interest—actually does a better job of 
explaining the Erie cases than Hanna does. The reference to these interpretive tools 
is more explicit when the federal law in question is not in a federal rule. But the need 
for interpretation exists on both sides of the purported Hanna dichotomy, and the 
same factors and should be consulted whether a federal rule is involved or not. 
It is preferable to examine the underlying state interests at the level of interpretation 
rather than validity of the federal rule. That is, if a federal rule touches too deeply upon 
areas traditionally left to the states and seems in that sense “substantive,” the better 
outcome is to declare that the rule was not intended to apply in that situation rather than 
declaring the rule to be invalid. In that way, the rule can be used in states in which there 
is no conflicting state substantive policy. This results in a patchwork of answers to Erie 
questions, a federal rule being used in diversity in some cases and not in others, but 
that is entirely appropriate if one remembers the preemption roots of Erie. Preemption 
is inherently a state-by-state proposition, since some state laws will conflict with or 
stand as obstacles to federal law and others will not. 
Finally, the category of Erie cases in which the federal rule conflicts with state 
law in such a way as to render dual compliance impossible is and should be narrow. 
If, as will usually be the case, compliance with either state or federal law is possible, 
one should not automatically apply the federal law. Instead, consistent with obstacle 
preemption, a court should examine the underlying federal policy to see if state law 
is in fact an obstacle to it. Again, in line with the foregoing, this makes only a very 
few cases simple; the majority of Erie issues will require extended analysis. But this 
is a question of federalism, and there is no reason to think that the federalism issues 
in Erie are any more straightforward than they are elsewhere. 
In the end, there is but a single bird that is our target. Erie and preemption are the 
same problem, albeit in somewhat different contexts. Remembering this, and 
applying to Erie the lessons of preemption, will in fact make Erie analysis more 
cogent as well as more accurate. 
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